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           “Seek First to Understand, Then, to Be Understood” 





Background: Information and information systems are a vital resource for an organiza-
tion. Data breaches cannot be prevented by technical measures alone, that is why this 
thesis looks at the human element in the search for understanding compliance with se-
curity policies. The context is the hospital sector with the aim of understanding the ac-
tual behavior of employees and the divergence of convergence with prescribed policies.  
Theoretical lens: The study adopts the lens of Value-Based Compliance theory, which 
has its roots in the health care sector. This theory describes information security actions 
as 1) prescribed (the written policies), and 2) actual (the actual behavior of employees) 
and looks for goals and values associated with prescribed and actual information secu-
rity actions to identify potential conflicts.  
Method: This thesis follows a qualitative approach through a case study of SSHF Kris-
tiansand with interviews and documents as the data sources. The interview data are col-
lected from fifteen interviewees: nurses, unit leaders, and information security workers. 
The data analysis is performed following the value-based compliance method. This 
method is a development of the value-based compliance theory.  
Results: Findings from the study indicate that both supports and conflicts are present at 
SSHF. Five situations are presented in tables and summary figures to give an overview of 
the goals and values linked to the actions of the prescribed rules. It is shown that the ac-
tual practice differentiates from the prescribed policies, which is not unusual. Based on 
the actual practice, we see that for nurses, efficiency (V5) stands out as a recurring value 
but also availability (V6) and quality of health care (V7). For the prescribed policies, con-
fidentiality (V1) and privacy (V4) are the most recurring ones. 
Implications: Our results provide insights about the rationalities behind the actual 
practices of nurses. We present patterns or situations that the management team is not 
always aware of today. We also present a set of underlying reasons for the choices that 
nurses have for their non-compliance. These insights can be further used when develop-
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In today's society, information, and information systems (IS) are vital resources for or-
ganizations. Data losses and security breaches can cause significant problems for organi-
zations related to both economics and reputation. As technologies advance and mature, 
organizational information systems are starting to become more secure and robust. This 
has shifted the focus from just a technical perspective, to also include the human ele-
ment, in other words, towards a holistic view on security (Herath & Rao, 2009). It is 
widely acknowledged in the literature that the human element is the weakest link in IS-
security and, therefore, organizations focus on using tools to guide the employees. "Secu-
rity policies and codes of conduct are frequently the main, or only, tool used by managers 
to guide and control employees' security behaviors" (Hedström, Kolkowska, Karlsson & 
Allen, 2011, p. 373). Security policies are introduced by information security managers 
and aim to guide employees into the same strategic path as the organization. Therefore, 
security policies are based on values at the management level of organizations 
(Hedström et al., 2011).  
Nevertheless, there can be differences between the actual users of the policies and the 
policy creators. Interestingly, "the design [of policies] is based on the creator's design ra-
tionale, while the use is based on the user's use rationale" (Hedström, Karlsson & Kolkow-
ska, 2013, p. 270). These different rationales indicate that there might be discrepancies 
between the designed policies and the actual use of them. Herath & Rao (2009) argue 
that if users do not follow the security policies, the policy efforts are in vain.  
 
Several researchers have investigated employee divergence or non-compliance to secu-
rity policies, using different theoretical models and testing them empirically. For exam-
ple, prior research has used deterrence theory, which proposes that when punishment is 
a certainty, and the severity of punishment is increased, then; as a result, non-compli-
ance is reduced (D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009). Other often-used 
theories are the theory of planned behavior (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010), 
which evolves around that “Intentions to perform behaviors of different kinds can be pre-
dicted with high accuracy from attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and per-
ceived behavioral control.” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 179). 
  
Another theory is neutralization, which is a summary of various techniques a person 
uses to justify actions deviant behavior (Sykes & Matza, 1957). An employee might jus-
tify their action based on that their deviant actions did not cause any harm; this tech-
nique is called denial of injury (Sykes & Matza, 1957). This prior research has a common 
orientation: the research aim is about shaping behavior and controlling the employees 
to ensure compliance with the information security policies. However, prior research by 
Hedström et al. (2011) showed that looking into examples where practitioners did not 
comply with policies can bring a new view of information security compliance. Instead 
of controlling employees into compliance, the research by Hedström et al. (2011) is ori-
ented to creating an understanding of the underlying values that shape the non-compli-
ance. The findings from that article have been developed over time from a theoretical 
framework (Karlsson & Hedström, 2008), to the value-based compliance (VBC) method 





1.1 Research context and motivation 
 
We chose to conduct a study on information security compliance in the public Norwe-
gian health care sector. This is a critical sector in the society, and IS-security becomes es-
pecially important because of all the sensitive patient information the hospital handles. 
Having data breaches or leaks of patient information can severely hurt the privacy of the 
affected individuals. Within the health sector, we decided to focus on the hospital seg-
ment as it represents large organizations with employee-numbers often in the range of 
thousands. The considerable size of hospitals, combined with the critical and confiden-
tial information they handle, makes it essential to ensure proper information security.  
After reviewing related research literature, we identified a gap related to actual prac-
tices in the Norwegian health sector: little is known about the reasons why employees 
comply or not with information security policies. However, we found studies (Hedström 
et al., 2011; Kolkowska, Hedström & Karlsson, 2009) conducted in our neighboring 
country, Sweden, and these motivated us to try similar research here in a Norwegian 
context. Our research aims to explore and get insights into actual day to day practices.  
 
Not following policies in health care practices can have negative consequences for the 
patient, but also the health care personnel.  
 
In any organisation that holds significant amounts of sensitive personal infor-
mation, a data breach requires investigation which seeks to pinpoint the causes, 
and this often results in the identification of a culprit. Sometimes he/she becomes a 
focus of media interest. (Renaud & Goucher, 2012, p. 297).  
 
We have seen cases in Norwegian media were health care workers are being blamed or 
accused of leaking patient information, and sometimes the media is exposing the iden-
tity of the health care worker. This can, of course, be a heavy burden to bear for the per-
son being accused. Nursing personnel, in particular, have to work under significant time 
pressure while they also have to adhere to a multitude of rules and regulations. The 
Code of Conduct, “Normen” in Norwegian (The Norwegian Directorate of eHealth, 2020), 
is a collection of these laws, which aims to present them more understandably for the 
health care workers to read. For this master thesis, we decided to focus on the infor-
mation security practices of nursing personnel.  
 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
 
Our initial thoughts were to look for threats associated with information security within 
the hospital sector, but not technical IS-security issues. This led us to look into the socio-
technical perspective, looking for how individuals interact with technology and other in-
dividuals. After a small pre-study, we conducted at Hospital of Southern Norway (SSHF) 
Kristiansand the previous semester, we decided to focus our study on nursing personnel 
and how they relate to IS-security in their daily work. In order to get an understanding 
of this, we wish to look at the values that drive and affect the way nurses carry out their 
routines. With our research, we aim to bring up instances where nurses’ values are in 
conflict with security policies and also instances where values are harmonious with se-




What are the value conflicts and supports of information security compliance in nursing 
practices? 
 
We want to be exploratory in our study in order to identify the actual practices related 
to security policies. First, we need to find out what the prescribed policies are, and then 
what the actual practices are like at the hospital. To be able to answer the research ques-
tion, we have to break it down into sub-questions: 
 
▪ What are the goals and values behind information security policies at SSHF? 
▪ What are the goals and values driving the actual practices of nursing personnel? 
 
On the basis of, and to answer these questions, we conducted a qualitative study in the 
health sector with an explorative case study of SSHF Kristiansand. Prior to this thesis, 
we did a small pre-study at SSHF, focusing on insider threats. Insights gathered from the 
preliminary research helped us with the shaping of the research questions for this study.  
 
 
1.3 Content and structure  
 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows; In chapter two, we include literature that 
forms the foundation for our research and introduce the main concepts that we explore. 
In chapter three, we introduce the value-based compliance theory, which guided this re-
search. Chapter four summarized our method used throughout our thesis. In chapter 
five, our empirical results are presented; these are then discussed in the light of prior re-
search in chapter six, discussion. In chapter seven, we elaborate on the limitations, fu-
ture directions, and implications for both research and practice. Chapter eight is a con-
clusion of the thesis with references and appendixes following in the last chapters, nine 




2. Related literature 
 
In this chapter, we describe how we did the initial literature review and also how we ex-
tended our literature assessment at a later stage in our thesis. We present here both 
how we performed the literature review and also an overview of the concepts that were 
found and synthesized during the review process.  
 
 
2.1 Literature search 
 
For the literature review process, we used the structured approach provided by Web-
ster & Watson (2002). The articles we ended up including were not only based on one 
journal, author, or geographic location but rather a variety of these variables. We argue 
that such a variety can give us insights from different perspectives, not limiting us to 
only using research from the US, for example. We followed the steps provided in Web-
ster & Watson (2002) to determine the articles that we felt could help us in answering 
our research question.  
 
For the first step, we started by searching for literature in the basket of eight for infor-
mation systems journals, but due to our chosen theme, we had to expand our search. We 
decided to also include literature from other research domains, including research in the 
health sector, socio-technical security research, and organizational culture. This led us to 
an extensive literature basis to work on further. We also followed the second and third 
steps from Webster & Watson (2002), which included forward and backward searches 
for the given articles. This gave us insights from the past about employees' compliance 
and non-compliance with information security has been a big problem over time. As for 
our search criteria, we mainly wanted articles from the last twenty years. The reason to 
focus on the last twenty years is that we wanted relatively new findings, and most of the 
research on the domain has been conducted in this period with an increasing amount 
the last years.  
 
During our preliminary research, we started with a focus on insider threat and related 
mitigation techniques. This search gave us solid insights into other lenses to look at the 
topic of non-compliance. The literature review gave us valuable insight and helped us 
take another angle of the topic, looking into the values of employees in relation to com-
pliance. We identified a subset of research papers that fit well with our research inter-
est. Specifically, these are the papers by Kolkowska et al. (2017), Hedström et al. (2011), 
and Bulgurcu et al. (2010). Moving on to the more fitting literature, we decided to do 
forward and backward searches on Kolkowska et al. (2017), Hedström et al. (2011), and 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) in addition to general searches on information security compli-
ance. These new searches gave us new insight into the topic of compliance. At the end of 
this process, we felt that we had a satisfactory overview of the topic, which is summa-
rized in the next subsection.  
 
2.2 Summary of literature review  
 
Research on information system security is an essential and expanding topic that has 
shared a lot of different views and approaches to deal with the topic.  On a more specific 
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level, the studies on non-compliance with policies have emerged. In prior research, there 
is a broad agreement that employees who violate or ignore the security policies create a 
significant problem, and reducing this is of interest. Deterrence theory is one of the most 
widely applied theories in IS-security research, particularly within behavioral IS security 
studies (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011). This theory was used back in 1990 with Straub Jr 
(1990) but also in newer articles (Cheng, Li, Y., Li, W., Holm & Zhai, 2013; D'Arcy et al. 
2009). The theory has contributed with great insights, both theoretical and practical, but 
also had some inconsistent and mixed results (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011). As this topic is 
widespread between several disciplines, looking into the problem from several angles is 
needed.  
 
Von Solms (2001) summarized information security as a multidisciplinary discipline, 
which he argued that looking into the strategic-, policy, ethical, human, awareness, tech-
nical dimensions to mention some and that each one is important. This has called for ad-
ditional research from other perspectives. Siponen & Vance (2010) challenged the view 
of deterrence and introduced the neutralization theory into the information security 
field. This evolves around employees justifying their actions; For example, a person per-
forming a deviant action justifies his/her behavior by claiming that no damage will re-
ally be done (Siponen & Vance, 2010).  
 
Another regularly used theory is, the theory of planned behavior (TPB) is a theory that 
suggests that the intention to perform various kinds of behavior can be predicted with 
high accuracy using different factors (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). The results in the paper 
show that employee's compliance is affected by different factors such as attitude, nor-
mative beliefs, and self-efficacy to compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). “Success in infor-
mation security can be achieved when organizations invest in both technical and socio or-
ganizational resources” (Bulgurcu et al., 2010, p. 524).  
 
Additional research has evolved around understanding each employee's behavior to-
wards information security. The results from Pahnila, Siponen & Mahmood (2007) sug-
gest that information quality has a significant effect on actual IS security policy compli-
ance. Attitude, normative beliefs, and habits have a significant effect on the intention to 
comply with IS-security policies. This was further explored by Ifinedo (2012), as he 
viewed the theory of planned behavior (TPB) and protection motivation theory (PMT). 
The results showed that the intention to comply was positively influenced by self-effi-
cacy, response efficacy, attitude towards compliance, perceived vulnerability, and sub-
jective norms (Ifinedo, 2012). 
 
Another viewpoint that has gotten attention is the topic of IS-security, and the conflicts 
security creates with other demands in an organization. “In the set of demands for infor-
mation security, functionality, usability, and efficiency, the users tend to prioritise the lat-
ter three ahead of information security, particularly if the information security workload 
becomes unacceptable.” (Albrechtsen, 2007, p. 285). Vaast (2007) also elaborates on this 
topic by looking into different occupational communities, and that conflicts are related 
to differences in perspectives. Albrechtsen & Hovden (2009), also shares this viewpoint 
in another context with information security managers versus users. User and infor-
mation security managers have different responsibilities and rationalities, which creates 
a different understanding of information security between them. Information security 
managers have primary responsibility for information security, but the users also have 
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other tasks in addition to organization goals such as productivity and efficiency (Al-
brechtsen & Hovden, 2009). The users are aware of their role in information security; 
however, there is a gap between the intention of information security and the actual be-
havior of users regarding the topic (Albrechtsen, 2007). 
 
This creates a field in information systems security of looking into the reasons for why 
these conflicts exist. "The design [of countermeasures] is based on the creator's design ra-
tionale, while the use is based on the user’s use rationale." (Hedström et al., 2013, p. 270). 
This study is based on Hedström et al. (2011), which presented a theoretical model 
where you investigate information security from another perspective rather than the 
typical control-based models. This view centers around the fact that practitioners base 
their actions on different value-rationalities when complying or not complying with in-
formation security guidelines (Hedström et al., 2011).  
 
This model and the theoretical view have been even further developed into a method, 
named the Value-Based Compliance method (Kolkowska et al., 2017). In that paper, they 
address the problem of the lack of a way to analyze multiple rationalities that come into 
play when working with information security (Kolkowska et al., 2017). The empirical 
evidence from the article showed concrete situations where practitioners chose health 
care values over information security values. This view from health care workers is, 
however, not new, as Gaunt (2000) argues that “the protection of information is less im-
portant than direct patient care, which is something that pervades clinical services in gen-
eral.” (p. 152).  
We think this sizable literature review creates a good overall overview of the topic. This 
also helped us in identifying key concepts related to our research. These are defined and 
described in the following subsection.  
 
 
2.3 Definitions of Concepts 
 
In this subsection, we elaborate on our key concepts relating to our research questions. 
The concepts are a result from our literature review and have the intention to provide a 
foundation of knowledge on the topic. In the last part of this section, we explain how the 
concepts can be connected, and we present what areas we will focus on the study.  
 
2.3.1 User Values / User Rational 
"There is widespread agreement that people's value priorities play an important role in 
predicting their attitudinal and behavioral decisions." (Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, Var-
tiainen & Vance, 2009, p. 128). Schwartz & Bilsky (1987) distinct between different 
value contents is suggested by the idea that, because values are goals, they must repre-
sent the interests of some person or group. They were defining values as goals that give 
guidance and motivation and guiding individuals in a direction. The values are con-
nected to an individual's identity both on a personal level and professional and that the 
values affect behavior, evaluations, and choice of actions (Myyry et al. 2009).  
 
However, the view on value is not just on individual levels. Vaast's (2007) research 
shows that information security holds different meanings in different occupational com-
munities. Looking at the hospital sector, Vaast (2007) argues that different communities 
such as nurses, physicians, and technicians view information security in unlike ways 
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even though they are all connected to patient care as a basis. Albrechtsen & Hovden 
(2009) share this view, which argues that information security managers and employees 
have different responsibilities as users have other important work tasks and infor-
mation security, which is the main focus of information security managers.  
 
Health care involves many different collaborating and communicating actors, such 
as politicians, civil servants, health care professionals, administrators, and manag-
ers on different levels. This complex structure leads to a varied and diverse work 
practice with many concurrent actors, actions, goals, and values. (Kolkowska et al., 
2009, p. 2).  
 
Weber (1978), elaborates on four different types of social actions: traditional, affec-
tional, value-oriented, and instrumental. The traditional actions are carried out based on 
tradition; in other words, habits. The affectional actions are based on a person's feelings 
also sometimes without thinking of the consequences. The value-oriented actions are 
based on “conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, 
or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success” (Weber, 1978, p. 24-
25). The last type of social action, instrumental, is based on the “expectations as to the 
behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings …” (Weber, 1978, p. 
24). In other words, the actors are basing the actions on the consequences. Weber 
(1978) also further divides the four types into two types: rational and non-rational. Two 
of the four are based on rationality, value-oriented and instrumental actions. While the 
other two, traditional and affectional actions, are based on non-rationality and does not 
include mental processes when carried out (Hedström et al., 2013).  
 
Based on the original view from Weber (1978) and the theory of organizational learning 
(Argyris & Schön, 1996), Karlsson & Hedström (2008) created the value-based compli-
ance theory. The VBC theory, which consists of a set of concepts, can be depicted as Uni-
fied Modeling Language (UML) classes: information security action (ISA) (prescribed 
and actual), actor, goal, and value (Hedström et al., 2011). "Practitioners base their ac-
tions on different value rationalities when complying or not complying with information 
security guidelines." (Hedström et al., 2011, p. 375). A concrete example from Hedström 
et al. (2013) is that an employee fails to log out of the computer system because the em-
ployee rushes off to an emergency, which can be connected to affectional actions from 
Weber (1978) as the action is based on feelings. These types of situations are situations 
where the value conflicts between different values might arise. "By viewing information 
security actions as social actions, it is possible to gain awareness of the underlying reasons 
for users' compliance and non-compliance without any a priori assumptions about user in-
tent." (Hedström et al., 2013, p. 284). As the actions of employees often are shared be-
tween occupational communities, looking into the concept of security culture is also 
needed.  
 
2.3.2 Security Culture 
Security culture, in this context, is the culture among the employees when focusing on 
security. "Organisational culture comes into being in the gaps within and between formal 
business processes and takes the shape of employee values, beliefs, and assumptions about 
what are acceptable short cuts, workarounds, or informal ways of working in the organisa-
tion." (Ashenden & Sasse, 2013, p. 396). The culture is something that affects how secu-
rity is handled in the organization. In the context of different values between different 
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groups of employees, we see security culture as a middle ground between the pre-
scribed and actual actions. Connecting the actions based on non-rationality with security 
culture, we see, for example, deeply rooted habits that employees may just perform 
without thinking of the consequences behind them can be connected to the accepted in-
formal ways among a group of employees. If these types of actions are based on deeply 
rooted habits that are based on unhealthy values, they might harm the organization, a 
change, or at least an understanding of why this happens might be needed.  
 
Having proper training and awareness programs might increase the culture in organiza-
tions. "The organisational culture should be considered when cultivating an information 
security culture to ensure that the most appropriate controls are identified and deployed in 
a successful manner." (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010, p. 198). An essential role of the policies 
and underlying values is to make sure that the actions taken are following the correct 
pathway. Therefore, looking into the values of actual actions and creating an under-
standing will help the organization to create a thriving security culture.  
 
2.3.3 Policies 
The policies in an organization are the given rules that employees must or at least 
should follow to every given time at work. Are the policies in the organization clear and 
easy to understand? Do the policies act as an obstacle for daily work because they are 
too strict?  
 
The first step to preparing the organization against these threats is the develop-
ment of a systems security policy which provides instruction for the development 
and implementation of a security posture, as well as provides guidelines for the ac-
ceptable and expected uses of the systems. (Whitman, Townsend & Aalberts, 2001, 
p. 10). 
 
We define information security policy, like Bulgurcu et al. (2010), “as a statement of the 
roles and responsibilities of the employees to safeguard the information and technology re-
sources of their organizations.” (p. 526-527).  However, creating these policies is a good 
starting point; it is not enough to make the employees comply with them (Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010). They further argue that creating an understanding of what motivates employ-
ees to comply with the information security policies and to solve issues regarding them 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). 
 
“There is often a misunderstanding between the policy writer and the reader so that 
the reader is unable to understand what is required or how to achieve it.” (Renaud & 
Goucher, 2012, p. 299). This shared view is something that Vaast (2007) also found in 
the research of different healthcare communities, where the different groups had differ-
ent understandings. This is where the connection to values comes in to play; previous 
research has focused on how to make the employees adhere to policies. However, we ar-
gue that creating an understanding of why these misunderstandings and differences 
happen rather than control-approach might be more helpful.  
 
“… managers need to be very cautious in choosing the manner, medium, and method of in-
troducing new ISPs and organizational policies.” (Lowry & Moody, 2015, p. 450). Another 
factor is the way these policies are presented, ISPs should be formal written controls, 
but presented in a respectful manner that softens or eliminates imperatives and provide 
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options (Lowry & Moody, 2015). Albrechtsen & Hovden (2009) argue that both security 
managers and users call for more significant interaction and dialogue from both sides. 
This is in line with our thoughts, and we see that understanding the value behind actions 
of non-compliance by employees could be a good starting point of this dialogue. We, 
therefore, argue that looking into values, policies, and behavior together might be suited.  
 
2.3.4 Behavioral 
This concept is connected to both security culture and policies. How does the employee 
behave in a work context? Do they follow the security policies, or do they find worka-
rounds? Creating an understanding of behavior in an information security context has 
been on the agenda for some time in diverse contexts. Research has shown that individ-
uals with different dispositional factors (internal factors) react differently to similar sit-
uational factors (external factors) in the context of security-related behavior (Johnston, 
Warkentin, McBride & Carter, 2016). An example from the hospital sector might be a 
nurse goes for a coffee and locks the computer while another nurse might not lock the 
computer. Creating understandings of why individuals and groups act differently in the 
same situation is something that understanding the values behind these actions can help 
us with. The action of not locking or locking the computer when leaving might be due to 
it being a habit (irrational) or even based on a rationality that the computer can get com-
promised by an unauthorized person. This diversity in actions is of interest; in addition, 
we also include the concept of compliance.  
 
2.3.5 Compliance 
How do you get employees to follow regulations and policies? There is a multitude of 
motivations behind people's intention to adhere to rules, and different personalities may 
also affect how people choose to comply. These actions can be based on irrationality and 
rationality, which has raised a research agenda with a focus on non-compliance. If em-
ployees' compliance benefits the organization, they are more likely to have positive atti-
tudes towards compliance (Herath & Rao, 2009). We also see that deterrence can be 
used to deter employees from non-compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 
2009). 
 
We also see a connection to the information security culture. “For example, peers or men-
tors often inadvertently empower an employee to neutralize and violate policy by saying in 
passing, for example, that “few people actually follow this password policy.”.” (Barlow, 
Warkentin, Ormond & Dennis, 2013, p. 154). These are situations where non-compliance 
with policies might get out of hand and that groups of employees create procedures that 
conflict with the policies. This can, for example, happen when employees feel that the 
policies act as a hindrance to work and therefore are less likely to have a favorable view 
of the policies (Herath & Rao, 2009). This calls for better communication between infor-
mation security managers and employees when creating policies (Albrechtsen & 
Hovden, 2009).  
 
The overall view on information security compliance research has been with a focus on 
the shift from non-compliance to compliance. The results from Barlow et al. (2013) sug-
gest that neutralization techniques are just as effective as deterrence approaches to shift 
the view. For example, employees might feel not comply with a policy because they feel 
like the actions do not hurt anyone. This can be linked to individuals creating un-secure 
passwords on systems even though the policies say they must create secure passwords. 
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The individual's actions are then neutralized by having this password on a system with-
out sensitive information. This might be the case sometimes, that actions that violate 
policies are not actually harming the information security. We argue that you can not 
look at compliance as black and white and that there will be situations in the grey area.  
 
All these concepts are selected from literature related to our topic. Many of these con-
cepts do have a direct or indirect relationship together. Looking into the policies and the 
behavioral aspect of the actual behavior and what is behind those actions are our core 
interest. These similar topics have all been in the research radar for information security 
and are rich in data; however, looking into them together in a Norwegian hospital con-
text has not yet been done to the best of our knowledge. In the next chapters, we will go 
deeper into the value-based compliance theory, and the value-based compliance 




3. Theoretical lens 
 
This chapter explains the Value-Based Compliance (VBC) theory and why we chose to 
use this lens for our thesis. Because we decided to focus on compliance, it became natu-
ral for us to look for theories that try to elaborate on said topic. When we, in our litera-
ture assessment, came across the VBC theory, we felt this would be a fitting way forward 
as this theory is specific about compliance. Also, the VBC theory has its roots in health 
care, which fits the context of our study. Since this theory matches both our aim and con-
text, we went with this specific theoretical lens.  
 




Figure 1: UML representation of the VBC model (Hedström et al., 2011). 
The UML model above is a representation of the value-based compliance theory. This 
theory was a result of a longitudinal case study of information security practice con-
ducted at a hospital in Sweden (Hedström et al., 2011). An actor in this model can be an-
yone, but in our study, actors are specifically nurses and information security workers. 
We look at the information security workers as the ones designing the prescribed Infor-
mation Security Actions (ISAs) and nurses as the actor that carries out the actual ISAs in 
general. An Information Security Action (ISA) can be 1) prescribed, or 2) actual. Pre-
scribed ISAs refer to the written policy and guidelines of how to act and behave. Mean-
while, the actual ISAs represent the way individuals actually behave in carrying out their 
daily work.  
We see possibilities for nurses to take part in the design process of prescribed rules, but 
in our study to simplify, we distinguish between the two groups. One or more infor-
mation security managers design the prescribed ISAs with value rationale as a founda-
tion. Besides, one or more goals related to the design rationale of the prescribed ISAs. As 
Hedström et al. (2011), we can only assume that there is a rationale behind the design-
ing of the prescribed ISAs.  
One or more nurses might carry out one or more actual ISAs. The nurse either has zero 
or more goals that they want to achieve by performing the actual ISA. As opposed to the 
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prescribed rules, there might not be a goal with the actual ISA (for example, leaving the 
computer screen unlocked) but, such actions can also have a reason (for example, time-
saving as the login process takes some time). According to the value-based compliance 
theory, goals and actions have an underlying foundation of values, with a value- ra-
tionale and base.  
 
The nurses base their actions on their goals and values, and these are manifested in ac-
tual ISAs, and the information security management bases their design of prescribed 
ISAs on their goals and values. This can lead to either compliance or non-compliance; in 
other words, we can find divergence between the actual and prescribed actions. Looking 
into the different value-rationales behind each action can help in the understanding of 
how the value rationales can contribute to conflicts or supports.  
 
3.2 Value-Based Compliance theory background 
 
The VBC theory is based on the theory of organizational learning (Argyris & Schön, 
1996) and the notion of Social Action Theory (Weber, 1978). Weber (1978) differenti-
ates between direct observational understanding and explanatory understanding. This 
is exemplified with 2*2=4. In direct observation, we understand the meaning of this 
when we read it or hear it; on the other hand, with the explanatory understanding, you 
look into what made the actor solve this math problem under these circumstances with 
precisely that movement. This can be connected to our research question: What are the 
value conflicts and supports of information security compliance in nursing practices? As 
we want to create an understanding of the values and tensions and not just find situa-
tions where the problem exists.  
 
Weber (1978) also sees social actions as not solely individual actions and that others can 
influence actions. In our case at the hospital, seeing other colleagues locking the com-
puter might influence your actions of locking the computer. The nurses act as members 
of a bigger group, and therefore exploring the group in total is a way of exploring the 
culture. As mentioned in Kolkowska et al. (2017), Weber also distinguishes between ra-
tional and irrational actions. This is one of the benefits of this theory, which evolves 
around values, that the rationality can easily be addressed as well as irrational actions 
with observations, which we will further elaborate in the method chapter.  
 
This type of theory basis fits well with the aim of our study. By digging deeper into the 
underlying values of both the prescribed- and actual ISAs, we are likely to be able to find 
value related conflicts and supports. Our theoretical lens has a focus on compliance with 
security policies bringing into attention the comparison between the actual practice 
with the written policies. Using the theory of value-based compliance, we will be able to 
look into specific actions and create an understanding of the behavior based on the un-
derlying values. By using the VBC theory on a role-level instead of a personal level, we 
can look at the nurse group’s values together and compare them with the policies which 







In this chapter, we introduce our qualitative research approach. First, we describe the 
general advantages of doing qualitative research. Second, we present the method we 
planned to follow. Third, is how we gathered the data. Finally, we present how we did 
our data analysis.   
 
4.1 Qualitative research  
 
Qualitative studies are designed to help researchers understand people and the social or 
cultural contexts where they live (Myers & Avison (Eds.)., 2002).  
 
Qualitative research is exploratory and is useful when the researcher does not know 
the important variables to examine. This type of approach may be needed because 
the topic is new, or the topic has never been addressed with a certain sample or 
group of people … . (Creswell, J. W & Creswell, J. D., 2017, p. 22).  
 
Looking into nursing personnel at SSHF and creating an understanding of how infor-
mation security is handled in daily work is what we want to explore. As this is a context 
we have limited knowledge about, we chose to go onward with a qualitative explorative 
approach.  
 
Interpretive studies generally attempt to understand phenomena through the meanings 
that people assign to them (Myers & Avison 2002). Trying to identify, explore, and ex-
plain how all the factors in a particular social setting are related and interdependent 
(e.g., an organization) (Oates, 2006 p. 292). Looking at the phenomena of information 
security compliance through the perceptions and meanings of nurses and information 
security managers. “Different groups or cultures perceive the world differently.” (Oates, 
2006, p. 292). By looking at the perspectives of the respective groups, we get knowledge 
of how both groups view information security. An interpretive approach is appropriate 
in studies of organizational culture as culture is a part of the organizational phenomena 
studied (Dubé & Robey, 1999). 
 
Oates (2006) argues that researchers are not neutral and that they have their assump-
tions, beliefs, values, and actions, and this will shape the research process. He also ar-
gues that the same criteria can not judge an interpretive and positivist study (Oates 
2006 p. 292). Lincoln & Guba (1985) proposes a set of criteria for interpretivism re-
search: trustworthiness, confirmability, dependability, credibility, and transferability. 
Instead of validity in positivist research, they argue that you look at trustworthiness and 
how much trust we can place in the research (Oates, 2006). In our study, looking at the 
trustworthiness, we had to assume that the information revealed in interviews is reflec-
tive in the reality of actual practice. However, during the interviews, we got similar in-
formation from nurses working in the same department, which is an indication that the 
information is valid. We also felt that the nurses were open to elaborate about the nega-
tive sides as it might be hard to speak about those as you do not want to expose the or-
ganization.  
 
“Interpretivists, however, believes that there will always be bias.” (Oates, 2006, p. 293). 
When talking about confirmability, another researcher can look at the raw data, analysis, 
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research notes, for example, and put themselves into our shoes (Oates, 2006). In general, 
have we been told enough about the study that the results can confirm the results? 
(Oates, 2006). We have tried to included citations from the actual interviews to show 
where our results are coming from in addition; we also include interview guides in ap-
pendices, and anonymized raw data are available by request.  
 
Regarding dependability, how well can this study be replicated? We present our planned 
research on a general basis in chapter 4.2, with a more detailed step by step way for-
ward in actual research in chapter 4.3 and 4.4. Based on this, other researchers should 
be able to trace our steps backward and be able to follow them. Oates (2006) argues that 
for interpretivists, what is being studied is a social construction by individuals, which is 
short-living and changing, so the same results are unlikely to be met for a repeated 
study. This is something to keep in mind as there is interpretation included in the re-
sults, and another researcher could have interpreted the same empirical material in an-
other way.  
 
Lincoln & Guba (1985) argue that you cannot look at internal validity in interpretivism 
and instead look at credibility. In other words, making sure that the information from 
interviews was accurately identified, so the findings are credible (Oates, 2006). During 
our interviews, we made sure to ask follow-up questions if there was any insecurity 
about what they meant. As we also wanted to find more about the values, we asked 
nurses to summarize what the goal and/or value behind their actions was. In that way, 
we could make sure that what they elaborated on for three minutes was correctly un-
derstood instead of speculating. This is also a method of checking the internal validity of 
the results. 
“Credibility … can be achieved by … checking for descriptions and interpretations, where 
researchers go back to their informants to check that their write-up is correct.” (Oates, 
2006, p. 294-295). Also, by having two researchers in the room for the interview makes 
sure that we agree with what was actually said in the interview (Johnson, 1997). A strat-
egy used in this case is investigator triangulation, with both of us taking place in all the 
interviews. We also used the strategy of data triangulation with the use of multiple data 
sources (Johnson, 1997). We did this by using both documents and interview data to un-
derstand the phenomena.  
 
The last criteria are transferability, can the findings in this case transferred to another 
case? The case is unique in one way but also similar to other hospitals. There will always 
be local differences at hospitals; however, we look at most Norwegian hospitals as simi-
lar. There will perhaps be different situations with other systems, size-differences, or 
other challenges related to different hospitals. A way forward at another hospital could 
be to validate the situations that we present at their hospital in a test interview to check 
the relevance.  
 
4.2 Research Approach 
 
For our planned research, we wanted to follow the Value-Based Compliance method. 
The VBC method is presented in Kolkowska et al. (2017) as an information security anal-
ysis method (ISAM). An ISAM has the purpose of acting as a tool to analyze the current 
situation regarding information security, also to provide an indication to where the fo-
cuses for improvement should be planned for in the future (Kolkowska et al., 2017). 
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Moreover, the VBC method is a result of the further development of the VBC theory. The 
VBC theory has its roots in a longitudinal case study conducted in a Swedish hospital 
(Karlsson & Hedström, 2008).  
The VBC method encompasses collecting data on the actual behavior of employees and 
analyzing it to compare it to the prescribed information security policies. “Identifying ac-
tual ISAs is seen to be one of the greatest challenges for behavioral information security re-
searchers.” (Kolkowska et al., 2017). The method is consistent with the theoretical lens 
and aims to help researchers apply the theoretical lens in empirical studies. We will, in 
the following paragraph, briefly describe the nine steps of the VBC method.  
 
The first step in the method in Kolkowska et al. (2017) is to determine the scope, aim, 
and focus of the study (1). You then move on to collecting policy documents (2) and 
identifying prescribed actions based on these documents (3). Moving on, you interview 
the policy designers about policy designers to get an understanding of the values and 
goals behind the policies (4). The analysis of the design and value rationale behind these 
actions are then grouped into tables with a linkage between prescribed actions, goals, 
and values (5). Then you move on to collecting data about the actual actions with both 
interviews and observations of employees as policy users (6). In the next step, you 
group the actual ISAs into tables with a linkage between the actual ISAs, goals, and val-
ues related (7). Analysis of the collected data by looking into the goals and values that 
are underlying each ISA (8). Finally, in the last step, you compare the prescribed and ac-
tual actions and the goals and values related to each (9). Analyzing the compliance and 
non-compliance and conflicts between practice and the written down rules. This pro-
cess, with all of the steps, is shown below in figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Value-Based Compliance method (Kolkowska et al., 2017).  
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Note: The authors of this thesis have colored the steps that involve analyzing for clarifi-
cation that analysis takes place at several stages in the method.  
 
4.2.1 Case study 
A case study focuses on one instance of the ‘thing’ that is to be investigated, for example, 
an organization (Oates, 2006). This instance is studied using various data generation 
methods to obtain a rich and detailed insight of that case (Oates, 2006). For our case-
study of SSHF, we used two methods: interviews and document analysis. The use of mul-
tiple sources and a wide range of data sources is something that characterizes case stud-
ies, for example, interviewing as many people as possible (Oates, 2006). This is an ex-
ploratory case-study with the focus of understanding the research problem using and 
testing an existing theory. “A researcher could take an existing theory and use a case study 
to see if the empirical evidence gained confirms the theory, implies necessary modifications 
to it, or contradicts it.” (Oates, 2006, p. 146).  
 
At SSHF, there are over 7000 employees with over 550 000 patient treatments every 
year (Hospital of Southern Norway, 2019) This shows how complicated and huge the or-
ganization is and how much information is located at the hospitals. The hospitals are lo-
cated in Kristiansand, Arendal, and Flekkefjord, but we only focused on the hospital in 
Kristiansand. We look at SSHF as a typical hospital and that our findings can also apply 
to other Norwegian hospitals. After the health reform in 2002, the specialist health ser-
vice was organized into four regional health enterprises: Northern Norway-, Central 
Norway-, Western Norway-, and South-Eastern Norway Regional Health Authority, 
which SSHF operates under (South-Eastern Norway Regional Health Authority, 2019). 
 
In the Norwegian health- and care sector, more and more of the communication is elec-
tronic. Due to the challenges this brings to privacy, The Norwegian Directorate of Health 
started working on rules for safe information handling in 2002 and formally introduced 
in 2006 (The Norwegian Directorate of eHealth, 2020, 21. April).  
 
4.2.2 Interviews 
According to Myers & Newman (2007), a qualitative interview is used in all kinds of 
qualitative research; case studies, action research, ethnographies, and grounded theory.  
Interviews are a type of conversation between people with one person undertaking the 
interview and want to gain knowledge about the other(s) (Oates, 2006). Interviews are a 
suitable data generation method when researchers want to gain detailed information 
and questions that are open-ended (Oates, 2006). We used a semi-structured approach 
with a set of situations and themes we wanted to cover. In semi-structured interviews, 
you are willing to change the order of questions and ask additional follow-up questions 
(Oates, 2006). This was indeed the case for us, we had a set of situations ready, but the 
nurses could elaborate freely and introduce new topics of interest during the interviews.  
Before the interviews, we planned the questions and the topics based on literature and a 
validation process. Oates (2006) also argues that you should gather background infor-
mation about your interviewees and their context. This is something we did, we gath-
ered information about the departments we interviewed, as we did not have much 
knowledge about the nurse work or departments beforehand. In addition, we also asked 
the interviewees about intro and basis information and what was typical about their 
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department compared to others. We followed the same semi-structured approach for in-




Informed consent is one of the underpinnings of doing research; this consent evolves 
around the person(s) being studied and that they are participating in their own free will 
(Jacobsen, 2015). This is something we took seriously during our interview process; we 
made sure that every participant had signed the agreement, which was approved by the 
Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). In the agreement, we informed the partici-
pant about this being a voluntary study and that they could interrupt the agreement at 
any point along with information about the study and what kind of data we stored.  
 
All the data collected in our data collection was anonymized using N1-N12 for nurses 
and A1-A3 for the administrative workers. We did not collect any private information 
from the personal life of the respondents but rather related to the work in a department 
with several employees. However, we put a disclaimer that specific statements could 
possibly be traced back to the respondent. This is a challenge you must take into account 
when working with small sample sizes (Jacobsen, 2015).  
In addition to the NSD approval, we also signed a non-disclosure agreement, a data pro-
cessing agreement to be able to carry out the data collection at the hospital. Before we 
got approval by the hospital, we also had to send in information about the project we 
proposed. In this process, we had to fill out an application with information about the 
project, send them the informed consent, the approval from NSD, and a project outline.  
In addition, the data collected during our thesis will only be held until the project is fin-
ished, after the thesis is delivered and evaluated, all the data will be discarded. The fol-
lowing subsection will elaborate on how we did this data collection.  
 
4.3 Data Collection  
 
In this subsection, we present the actual steps for data collection that we followed. This 
is based on steps 1,2,4 and 6, of the Value-Based Compliance method from Kolkowska et 
al. (2017). 
 
4.3.1 Decide on the demarcation 
We started by defining our scope, this being a master thesis, we knew the deadline for 
delivery, and this became the natural time-range of our study. In the previous semester, 
we had a course where we did a preliminary study of information security at SSHF. This 
helped us in getting in touch with the responsible persons at the hospital. Also, during 
the preliminary study, we did two interviews to get an understanding of the nursing per-
sonnel’s relation to information security and to gather knowledge about the information 
security manager's responsibilities.  
We initially wanted to do observations; however, after some discussion with our contact 
at the hospital, we decided to drop it as it would require approval on a higher level, 
which can be challenging to get. Given our limited timeframe, we could not afford to wait 
for such approval that might end up not been accepted after all. Doing observations in 
the hospital is considered by the management to be quite an intrusion of the employee's 
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and the patient’s privacy. If our study had a broader scope, it could more likely be feasi-
ble, but for two master students with a five-month timeframe, we quickly realized that 
such an undertaking might be too ambitious.  
So instead, we asked the hospital for twenty nurses to interview. We received contact 
information to eight and recruited four more during our visits to the hospital. The 
nurses varied from several departments, such as intensive unit, day-surgery depart-
ment, patient hotel, post-surgery, surgical bed station, and orthopedic/geriatric depart-
ment. As for the administrative workers, we interviewed three in total. Two of them, the 
ones working with information security, we planned to have several rounds of inter-
views with them.  
 
4.3.2 Collecting policy documents 
As we had familiarized ourselves with the hospital the previous semester, we knew 
where to look for background material. Most of it was open for public access on the hos-
pital's webpages. The information security manager assisted us in finding the relevant 
documentation. We had also asked the nurse we interviewed the previous semester, 
what documents she used to keep updated on rules and regulations related to infor-
mation security. Later in our study, we choose to limit ourselves to Normen (The Norwe-
gian Directorate of eHealth, 2020, 21. April), along with its supporting factsheets (The 
Norwegian Directorate of eHealth, (n.d.), as these contained the information we needed.  
 
4.3.3 Collecting data about actual actions 
This is step six in the Kolkowska et al. (2017) paper. However, we decided to gather and 
analyze data from actual actions before returning to investigate further the values be-
hind the prescribed ISAs (steps six & seven). In hindsight, it was a wise move to priori-
tize gathering data from the nursing personnel as early as possible in our study, as the 
outbreak of the Covid-19 virus pandemic would most likely put a severe halt to our data 
collection past March 12th.  
This step ideally consists of two substeps, (a) and (b), but since we were not doing ob-
servations, our only goal here was step (a), interviews with policy users. From our initial 
interview with a nurse, the previous semester identified important tasks and daily rou-
tines and what they want to achieve by doing it. In early 2020 we made many visits to 
the hospital in Kristiansand and interviewed our candidates from late February to early 
March. Our intension was to try and capture the user rationale behind their actions. The 
semi-structured interviews lasted between 30 to 45 minutes and were conducted with 
both of us present in the room. One of us was leading the interview, and the other was 
taking notes and keeping an overlook of the session as a whole. In addition to keeping 
the time and taking notes, this supporting interviewer helped by providing follow-up 
questions and making sure the main interviewer did not forget or dwell on any topic. All 
twelve interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
 
4.3.4 Interviews with the policy responsible 
After completing the data collection from nursing personnel on March 10th, we focused 
mainly on doing the analysis of the previous step (6). During this time, we were in con-
tact with the information security manager at the hospital, and we planned for a Skype 
meeting to get a better understanding of the intentions and goals of the prescribed poli-
cies and the underlying values they are based on. For this virtual interview, we dis-
cussed policies related to the five situations we present in this master thesis. The inter-
view consisted of both researchers, the information security manager (A1), and an ICT-
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advisor (A2), and lasted for 50 minutes. We had previously met both interviewees at 
their offices in Kristiansand and done a small pre-study the prior semester, and this 
helped ensure the virtual meeting run smoothly as our professional relationship was al-
ready established. This interview was semi-structured but with plenty of room for dis-
cussion planned. We established an open dialog and discussed prescribed ISA to the re-
lated situation, before moving on to the next ISA for discussion. The Skype interview 
was audio-recorded, and later it was transcribed.  
 
Subjects Duration 
A1 1:04:29        48:18         1:01:04 














Table 1: Overview of interviews 
The table above shows all the interviews that were conducted during this study. A total 
of fifteen individuals participated. We did three rounds with interviewees A1 and A2, as 
these were the ones working with the information security policies. This data collection 
process created a sound basis for further analysis of the empirical data gathered. The 
process of analysis is shown in the following subsection, 4.4 data analysis.  
 
 
4.4 Data Analysis  
 
In this subsection, we present how we analyzed the data collected from the previous 
chapter. This is based on steps 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9, of the Value-Based Compliance method 
from Kolkowska et al. (2017). 
 
4.4.1 Identifying prescribed actions 
As we investigated the collected documents, we took notes of concrete guidelines and 
paired them together with other texts and policies describing similar topics. A list of 
“do’s and don’ts” was assembled. It took some analyzing to understand and differentiate 
between the ISAs on our complete list. Around thirty prescribed actions were first iden-
tified before we grouped them into what we called “situations.” A situation could, for ex-
ample, be related to “users sharing passwords.” Then we put the ISAs regulating pass-
word sharing into this group. This situation-based later helped us when we were inter-
viewing the persons responsible for the policies. A total of fifteen situations were devel-
oped and became instrumental in conducting the interviews. Lastly, we translated the 
situations into English, with support from the hospital’s webpages and online 
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dictionaries. See Appendix 10.2 for the interview guide that led our dialog with the in-
formation security manager.   
 
4.4.2 Identifying actual actions 
For this step, we analyzed the data gathered from nursing personnel, comparing and 
grouping findings into a list of actual ISAs. The qualitative data analysis software, NVivo, 
was used to code and assisted us in keeping a systematic record of all the gathered data. 
While the transcribing of the recorded interviews was done individually, the coding and 
analysis were done with both of us present. When doing analysis, we quickly noticed 
that sometimes we looked at the same thing, but had a different view, a different inter-
pretation. We then discussed and re-listened to the recording of the interviews in ques-
tion. A lot of the times, we uncovered additional meanings or interpretations by paying 
careful attention to the little things like the interviewee’s cadence, when re-listening to 
our recordings. From identifying the prescribed ISAs in step three, we already had a set 
of fifteen situations with prescribed policies, that we now could line up to fit with the ac-
tual user actions findings. See Appendix 10.1 for the interview guide on how we pre-
sented the situations to the nursing personnel. 
 
4.4.3 Analysis of use and value rationale  
This is where we derived goals and values from the identified ISAs. We re-read the tran-
scripts and did further coding in NVivo, discussing between us two along the way. In our 
work, we looked for where the users chose to follow or ignore policies. Furthermore, we 
tried to uncover the reasons why or patterns for their actions based on the explanations 
provided during the interviews. Identifying user rationale was possible for most ISAs, 
but sometimes we encountered actions that were not related to specific rationales, like 
forgetting to lock a workstation when leaving it. Sometimes leaving a workstation un-
locked was explained to be a rational decision (when the nurse planned to return to it 
shortly after leaving it), when this was mentioned, we could extract the goal of time-sav-
ing from the action as was often indicated during interviews. During interviews, we 
would follow-up on examples like this and get an answer to why the workstation was 
left unlocked. We did not get to conduct follow-up interviews to investigate further 
some of the actions that were not discussed enough in the interviews to derive some-
thing from them. Efficiency, quality of health care, and availability were the two values 
that we encountered to most in our analysis.  
 
Code Value 
V1 It is important that information is confidential (Confidentiality) 
V2 It is important to ensure accountability (Accountability) 
V3 It is important to ensure information integrity (Integrity) 
V4 It is important to protect the privacy of patients (Privacy) 
V5 It is important to be efficient (Efficiency) 
V6 It is important to have information available (Availability) 
V7 It is important to ensure a high quality of health care (Quality of health care) 
V8 It is important to be aware (Awareness) 
Table 2: A list of values derived from actual and prescribed ISAs 
The process from the empirical data based on interviews with nurses to the actual goals 
and values behind them can be described by an example below.  
We started by presenting the situation, in this example, the shared user accounts and 
what we meant by this. We started with open questions such as “is shared user accounts 
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something that is in use here? Usernames and passwords that several employees have 
knowledge about.”. This open-ended question made sure that the nurses could elaborate 
on whatever system they wanted. For example, regarding shared user accounts, we got 
information regarding a shared user account for surgery planning. “In postoperative, we 
have a shared password for surgery planning, because the patients change so often that 
there is no time to log onto your computer, it is not enough computers for that either.” (In-
terviewee, N3). Already based on this statement, we could extract the fact that there is 
no time to log onto your computer, which can be linked to the fact that it is not efficient 
to change users every time (V5).  
 
However, we also included follow-up questions such as “Can you say something about the 
goal, why the shared user is there?”. That way, we could make sure that what was said 
earlier was what the nurse meant and if there were more reasons for the actual practice. 
In addition to the time-saving, there was also a vital purpose in coordinating the pa-
tients. “The surgery rooms are not coordinated, so you need to monitor several patients at 
the same time, to know who is coming next and that it is enough nurses who can receive 
the patients.” (Interviewee, N3). Based on these statements, we also included the value 
of having information available (V6), as the nurses valued having an easily available 
overview of the information of the patients they were taking care of, in this surgery 
planning system.  
 
4.4.4 Analysis of prescribed ISAs and value rationale  
Here we derived goals and values from the collected policy documents along with our 
transcribed interviews with the persons working with information security. We looked 
for confirmation or indicators in the text related to what the policies want to achieve. 
During our interviews, the three principles of the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, 
availability) were sometimes referred to by the information security manager. When 
this was the case, we then looked for other statements that could further confirm the 
statement. The result of this step was a list of goals and values that we grouped together 
with the existing list of situations and goals and values from the actual actions.  
 
Code Goal 
G1 Knowing who documents what 
G2 Only authorized personnel with access 
G3 Limit registering errors and missing information 
G4 Protect sensitive patient information 
G5 Easy access to information 
G6 Time-saving 
G7 Improve future treatment and systems 
G8 Learning from past mistakes 
G9 Increased visibility 
G10 Handle emergency 
Table 3: A list of goals derived from actual and prescribed ISAs. 
We include here an example of how we moved from the transcripts to goals and values. 
The example relates to our first situation, which is about authentication (Chapter 5.1). 
We presented our interviewees of statements from Normen, such as “Do not share your 
password or username with anyone else” (The Norwegian Directorate of eHealth, 2019, 
16. August) and “Lending the password to other people is not allowed.” (The Norwegian 




We then asked our interviewees to elaborate on these statements and why these policies 
are in place and essential. Interviewee A1 stated that “all actions performed must be 
linked to an authorized user; we must know that you are authorized.” Moreover, that the 
employees can be held responsible for what is done on your behalf; “we should have 
traceability.” (Interviewee, A1). Based on these statements, we could extract the goals of 
knowing who does what (G1) and only authorized personnel with access (G2). Further-
more, we could link those goals to the value of confidentiality (V1) and accountability 
(V2).  
 
4.4.5 Value-Based Compliance analysis  
In this final step, we analyzed our data to understand compliance and/or non-compli-
ance. First, we compared the actual ISAs with the prescribed ISAs to identify situations 
where there was a conflict. Then we compared the values and goals (rationality) behind 
the ISAs. This was presented in tables for details, and in figures for a visualization of the 
areas of conflict and support.   
The outcome of these steps is presented in the following chapter, 5. Results.   
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5. Results  
 
In this chapter, we present our empirical results based on interviews with nurses and 
information security workers as well as our document analysis. We organize the results 
around five key situations (authentication, information sharing, reporting, information 
access, and information protection). For each of the situations, we present a table that 
includes the prescribed ISAs with the source and the goals and values behind them 
based on empirical data from interviews. We also present a table of the actual ISAs of 
employees, along with their goals and values with connected interviewees who elabo-
rates on the specific ISA. Furthermore, for each situation, we present a figure which 
shows how the prescribed and actual ISAs are connected to each goal and value and the 
supports and conflicts between them. However, the prescribed and actual ISA do not 
necessarily have a 1:1 relation. (e.g., P4 might not be related or the opposite to A4). At 
the end of this chapter, the results are summarized in a concluding subsection. In Ap-
pendix 10.1, you can get a glimpse into the other situations we investigated in our data 
collection.  
 
5.1 Authentication  
 
Table 4 below presents three prescribed ISAs; these have been included because of their 
importance. The prescribed ISAs are meant to cover shared user accounts for a variety 
of systems, like Windows login, DIPS, surgery planning, and others.  
 
Prescribed ISA Source Goal(s) Value(s) 
P1: Do not share your 
password or username 
with anyone else 
Normen  
Factsheet 27 
G1: Knowing who docu-
ments what 
 
G2: Only authorized per-
sonnel with access 
 
G3: Limit registering er-
rors and missing infor-
mation 
V1: It is important that in-
formation is confidential 
(Confidentiality) 
 




V3: It is important to en-
sure information integrity 
(Integrity) 
P2: Lending the pass-




G2:  Only authorized per-
sonnel with access 
V1: It is important that in-
formation is confidential 
(Confidentiality) 
 
V2: It is important to en-
sure accountability (Ac-
countability) 
P3: Shared user ac-
counts should not be 
used in applications 




G4: Protect sensitive pa-
tient information 
V1: It is important that in-
formation is confidential 
(Confidentiality) 
 
V4: It is important to pro-
tect the privacy of pa-
tients (Privacy) 
Table 4: Authentication (Prescribed) 
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For this situation, we distinguish between sharing passwords and usernames at all times 
and lending it to a colleague for a one-time job. We also differentiate between Microsoft 
Windows login and other systems that contain sensitive patient information. All of the 
accounts are supposed to be personal for every system so that you can trace the actions 
back to a user and log the data. Interviewee A1 also stated that this applies when lending 
away accounts, “You get can be held responsible for what someone else does on your be-
halfs.” (Interviewee, A1). In general, the purpose is to make sure only authorized person-
nel can read and register information, meaning a basis of treatment. This is especially 
prohibited for systems that contain patient information, such as DIPS. However, the use 
of shared user accounts for Windows login is something that is used, as you don’t get ac-
cess to sensitive information. “There is a possibility that they have a collegial acceptance 
as the computer already was open, but formally it is a deviation.” (Interviewee, A1).  
 
 
In table 5 below, we present findings from our interviews with nursing personnel. The 
actual ISAs describe situations where shared user accounts are used. We also show the 
goals and values behind the non-compliance of the prescribed ISAs.  
 
Actual ISA Interviewee(s) Goal(s) Value(s) 
A1: Shared user ac-
count for surgery 
planning 
N3, N6, N7 & N8 G5: Easy access to in-
formation  








A2: Shared user ac-
count for MetaVision 
in the medicine room 
 
N9 & N10 G5: Easy access to in-
formation 









login for the patient 
transport booking 
system  




V7: It is important to 
ensure a high quality 
of health care (Qual-
ity of health care) 
Table 5: Authentication (Actual) 
When interviewing the nurses about the shared user accounts, there were three areas 
that used shared accounts; surgery planning, MetaVision, and patient travel booking. In 
the postoperative department, several nurses told us that a shared user is used for sur-
gery planning. This account has limited access, however earlier, they had more access 
and could look up sensitive information. The access has recently been more restricted, 
which has had a negative impact on the practical nurse work (Interviewee, N6). This was 
further confirmed: “I can only see the surgery planner, but I can’t check information on the 
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individual patient and read information about them. Then I must log in to my personal ac-
count.” (Interviewee, N8). 
Interviewee N3 also confirmed the use of shared users and added that this computer is 
located behind the reception desk, so it is not easily accessible for patients, next of kin, 
or any other visitors. Furthermore, in the postoperative department, there is a rapid pa-
tient flow of patients coming in and out that changing user accounts takes up too much 
time. Having easy access to the surgery planner also helps the coordination of the pa-
tient flow (Interviewee, N3). 
The situation with MetaVision was also like the use of shared accounts for surgery plan-
ner. The computers which were used for this were behind locked doors in the medicine 
rooms where only authorized personnel has access.  MetaVision was introduced 24 
hours before our interview, so it was challenging to have a definite opinion on this sys-
tem yet.  However, the first impression for the use of shared accounts was to ensure easy 
accessibility and to save time (Interviewee, N9, and N10).  
 
Regarding the third situation, ISA A3, this is a system that nurses use to book travel to 
get patients home from the hospital. Unless the user does not change its password 
within 90 days, the account gets locked. Interviewee N2 states: "Then it’s like we ask if 
anyone has an active user, e.g., at a hectic evening shift, it takes time to call the office and 
get it fixed.” In the patient travel booking system, just basic information about the pa-
tient is disclosed, like name, address, and if the patient has an exemption card for public 
health services. Getting the patient home, after finished treatment, is the intension for 





Figure 3: Authentication. 
Figure 3 shows the different prescribed- and actual ISAs, along with the connected goals 
and values for each. This figure shows the healthcare values such as efficiency (V5) and 
availability (V6), which tend to be prioritized over information security values such as 
confidentiality (V1) and accountability (V2) for given situations. The prescribed policies 
are created to know who documents what (G1), to make sure only authorized personnel 
has access (G2) and protect sensitive patient information (G4). As mentioned earlier in 
practice, nurses use shared user accounts for surgery planning and MetaVision. For 
these systems, several nurses use the same accounts, which conflicts with the prescribed 
ISAs (P1, P3). These solutions are related to having easy access to information and not 
login time with login and logout of systems. Another actual practice is related to lending 
user-login for patient transport systems to save time (G6), be efficient (V5), and ensure 
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high quality of health care (V7). After the treatment of patients, the nurses just want to 
make sure that the patients get home safely and efficiently, as this is the interest of the 
patients as well. This action is similar to shared user accounts for the other systems, that 
it also conflicts with confidentiality (V1) and accountability (V2).  
 
5.2 Information Sharing 
 
Table 6 below displays two prescribed ISAs that we found essential to cover situations 
were uncritical sharing of information might occur.  
 
Prescribed ISA Source Goal(s) Value(s) 
P4: Professional se-
crecy also applies be-
tween health personnel 
Normen 
Factsheet 27 
G2:  Only authorized 
personnel with access 
 
G4: Protect sensitive 
patient information 
V1: It is important that in-
formation is confidential 
(Confidentiality) 
 
V4: It is important to pro-
tect the privacy of patients 
(Privacy) 
P5: Make sure that un-
authorized persons do 
not listen when talking 
about patients with a 
colleague, on the phone 
or in a public place 
Normen 
Factsheet 27  
G2:  Only authorized 
personnel with access 
 
G4: Protect sensitive 
patient information 
V1: It is important that in-
formation is confidential 
(Confidentiality) 
 
V4: It is important to pro-
tect the privacy of patients 
(Privacy) 
Table 6: Information sharing (Prescribed) 
At the hospital, there are policies to protect the patient information, precisely; the poli-
cies are about the protection of unauthorized access and the privacy of patients. The 
rules apply independently if the information is revealed through a computer screen, via 
verbal communication face-to-face or by a phone call (Interviewee, A1). A notable clarifi-
cation here is that the professional secrecy also applies between health personnel, as 
you need a basis of treatment for the patient before you can discuss or reveal any re-
lated information (Interviewee, A1). “After all, you can discuss on a general basis, and you 
can also present a picture, curve or graph and discuss with a colleague because you need a 
"second opinion”." (Interviewee, A1).  
 
Actual ISA Interviewee(s) Goal(s) Value(s) 
A4: Nurses discuss 
patient information 
so other patients can 
easily listen to infor-
mation 
N2, N4, N5, N6, 
N7, N8, N10, 
N11 & N12 
G6: Time-saving V5: It is important to be effi-
cient (Efficiency) 
A5: Phone calls in the 
hallway or patient 
rooms  
N2, N7, N8, N9, 
N10, N11 & N12 
G6: Time-saving 
 
V5: It is important to be effi-
cient (Efficiency) 
Table 7: Information sharing (Actual) 
The actual practice of ISA A4 is one of the most acknowledged practices because of its 
natural appearance with double rooms, and even bigger groups of patients gathered to-
gether. As this is how the hospital organizes, other patients can listen to the information 
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they should not pick up (Interviewee, N11). This practice is something that is challeng-
ing to fix, and some solutions have been discussed and tried out, such as “bring the pa-
tient to other rooms, which is not always logical, natural, or practical” (Interviewee, N8). 
Other solutions they tried out was to add background music from a radio (Interviewee, 
N11) and use headphones (Interviewee, N6 & N12).   
 
Another similar and acknowledged practice is phone calls in hallways or patient rooms. 
When there is an incoming call, it is easy to answer the phone immediately without 
checking the surroundings for patients, colleagues, visitors, or other personnel that 
might overhear the conversation (Interviewee, N9, N11, N2, N10). This is also extra 
problematic as “People can actually pick up information as it is very resounding in the 
hallway and patient rooms.” (Interviewee, N9). A solution for this can be walking into an-
other room close by, e.g., storage or empty meeting rooms; however, busyness and get-




Figure 4: Information sharing 
In figure 4, we present the situation “Information sharing” with both prescribed- and ac-
tual ISAs that relate along with the goals and values these are based on. The prescribed 
ISAs are created to make sure that the information is confidential (V1) and that the pri-
vacy (V4) of the patient information is safeguarded. Based on our interviews with 
nurses, we found that patients can listen to information about other patients due to the 
layout of the rooms. This practice conflicts with the prescribed ISAs that are current for 
this situation.  
 
It should be said that even though it is a 2-person room if I have any serious mes-
sages to be given, we ask the sideman to go out or take the patient who will get the 
message in another room. (Interviewee, N2).  
 
So when there are serious messages, the nurses try to protect the sensitive case, but on a 
general basis, patients get more information than needed (Interviewee, N8, N11). For 
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this particular situation, there is tension with the time spent, for example, when moving 
the patient to another location (Interviewee, N8). 
The same applies to phone calls in the hallway or patient rooms where the nurses just 
want to be efficient (V5) and not walk the extra steps needed to safeguard the infor-
mation (Interviewee, N2). As a summary, this situation sums up as both a layout of the 
hospital and a decision problem. The layout makes it more challenging; however, there 




The following table nr. 8 shows two prescribed ISAs related to discrepancy reporting.   
 
Prescribed ISA Source Goal(s) Value(s) 
P6: Discrepancies and 
incidents shall be re-
ported in the discrep-
ancy processing system 
Normen 
Factsheet 27  
G7: Improve future 
treatment and systems 
 
G8: Learning from past 
mistakes 
V7: It is important to en-
sure a high quality of 
health care (Quality of 
health care) 
P7: Look at discrepancy 
reporting as an im-
provement measure 
that allows you to learn 




G7: Improve future 
treatment and systems 
 
G8: Learning from past 
mistakes 
V7: It is important to en-
sure a high quality of 
health care (Quality of 
health care) 
Table 8: Reporting (Prescribed). 
We learned from studying Normen, along with the supplying factsheets, that discrep-
ancy processing has the intension of being a tool for improvement by learning from 
prior mistakes (The Norwegian Directorate of eHealth, 2019). This was also the impres-
sion we were left with after our interview with administrative workers A1 and A2. When 
we asked the information security manager about what the goal behind the deviation re-
porting was, he stated: “Yes, it is primarily for learning and improvement, and not expose 
employees non-compliance.” (Interviewee, A1). In discrepancy reporting, it is essential to 
distinguish between reporting and the immediate action taken with the actions in the 
long run. For example, if the problem is recurring, you can change routines, procedures, 
or work methods (Interviewee, A1). “… the sum of the little things, individually, it might 
not be a big deal.” (Interviewee, A1). If there is a small problem recurring, this might end 
up being exposed as a big problem in the end. If these small discrepancies are reported 
several times, the sum of those might lead to changes and, hopefully, improvement.  
 
Table 9 below contains the actual ISAs regarding reporting that was revealed to us dur-
ing our interviews. This table shows the actual ISA along with the goals and values that 











Actual ISA Interviewee(s) Goal(s) Value(s) 
A6: Not reporting 
small discrepancies  




V5: It is important to 
be efficient (Effi-
ciency) 
A7: Claims to have 
good discrepancy re-
porting culture 
N5, N7, N9, N10, N11 
& N12 









V7: It is important to 
ensure a high quality 
of health care (Qual-
ity of health care) 
 
V8: It is important to 
be aware (Aware-
ness) 
A8: Just fix the inci-
dent rather than re-
porting 
N2, N4, N7 & N9 G6: Time-saving V5: It is important to 
be efficient (Effi-
ciency) 
 Table 9: Reporting (Actual). 
The use of the discrepancy reporting system had a variety of different answers and 
views during our interviews. One of the leading practices is that small discrepancies 
might get down prioritized due to time constraints (Interviewee, N2, N6, N8, N9). “[It is] 
often a lot easier to just fix the problem rather than writing discrepancy reports” (Inter-
viewee, N9). Actual ISA A6 and A8 are connected as there are often the small and the not 
that severe discrepancies that are just being fixed. “My perception is that if the patient is 
injured, the vast majority report. If there is no harm to the patient, then I think some peo-
ple spend time on it, but most do not.” (Interviewee, N6).  
 
An important factor regarding discrepancy reporting was to increase the visibility of the 
busyness in daily work (Interviewee, N9, N10). “When we are busy, that is when the mis-
takes happen. To make that more visible, we should report, so that management notices 
this“ (Interviewee, N9). Besides, reporting unwanted actions (discrepancies) has led to 






Figure 5: Reporting. 
Figure 5 shows an overview of the situation called “reporting.”. The prescribed ISAs (P6 
& P7) are created with the goals of improving future treatment and systems (G7) and 
learn from past mistakes (G8). These are both connected to an overall value at the hospi-
tal of ensuring high-quality health care (V7). “Excellent and proper patient care is our 
most important task” (Hospital of Southern Norway, 2016). On the other hand, we have 
the actual ISAs (A6 & A8), which are connected to time-saving (G6) and efficiency (V5). 
The practice of not reporting small discrepancies (A6) and just fixing it without report-
ing (A8) to be efficient (V5) conflicts with the value of high-quality health care (V7). The 
prescribed policies encourage you to report every discrepancy, but the actual practice is 
different as small discrepancies get skipped as the nurses want to be as efficient as pos-
sible.  
 
For the last actual ISA (A7), this is connected to the same goals (G7 & G8) and value (V7) 
as the prescribed rules. Several of our interviewees said that the reporting culture was 
good at their department, which had resulted in changes and improvements in the sys-
tems (Interviewee, N11). This means that the actual practice (A7) and the prescribed 
rules (P6 & P7) support each other for this given situation.  
 
Furthermore, this good reporting culture (A7) is also connected to increased visibility 
(G9) as one of the goals for the actual practice is to make the workload more visible for 
the management (Interviewee, N9, N10). This goal of increased visibility is created on 
the foundation of raising the awareness of various possible discrepancies and incidents. 
The increased awareness value (V8) is supported by the high-quality of healthcare (V7). 
We can, therefore, draw the conclusion that when you develop improved systems and 
learn from past mistakes, you create an environment with a higher quality of healthcare. 
Additionally, you also increase the awareness of the situations reported in on all levels 





5.4 Information Access 
 
The following table 10 contains three ISAs that regulate the information access at SSHF, 
with the focus of always being authorized when you get access to information.  
 
Prescribed ISA Source Goal(s) Value(s) 
P8: It is prohibited to 
read, search or acquire 
or use the information 
without justifying the 
patient's health care 
treatment 
Normen 
Factsheet 27  
G2:  Only authorized 
personnel with access 
 
G4: Protect sensitive pa-
tient information 




V4: It is important to 
protect the privacy of 
patients (Privacy) 
P9: All processing of 
personal data must 
have a legal basis 
Normen 
(6.0) 
G2:  Only authorized 
personnel with access 
 
G4: Protect sensitive pa-
tient information 
 




V4: It is important to 
protect the privacy of 
patients (Privacy) 
P10: You are not al-
lowed to open your 
spouse, relatives or 




G2:  Only authorized 
personnel with access 
 
G4: Protect sensitive pa-
tient information 




V4: It is important to 
protect the privacy of 
patients (Privacy) 
Table 10: Information Access (Prescribed). 
 
The prescribed rules are unambiguous for this particular situation as the hospital rules 
are clear and take care of the patient's privacy (Interviewee, A1). This was also further 
exemplified and clarified: “You can not work in the maternity ward and search up infor-
mation about a psychiatric patient.” (Interviewee, A1). Moreover, “You can not search for 
a relative who is hospitalized in psychiatry, as you have no rights for that” (Interviewee, 
A1).  You need to have authorization and a legal basis to search for information about 
patients. These rules also apply for employees that want to search for their journal, as 
they have no rights for that either (Interviewee, A1). This is also a part of the training for 
DIPS, which is mandatory for everyone who uses it, and they get introduced for it from 
day one (Interviewee, A2).  
 
The health worker's awareness regarding prying was further commented on by admin-
istrative worker A1.  
 
It is a part of the training, it is a part of the Agreement of Confidentiality, and it is a 
part of the computer user agreement you sign, that you have read and understood 




Being caught snooping can have severe consequences for your employment relationship. 
“We have had physicians that have been let go because of snooping.” (Interviewee, A1). 
With this seriousness in mind, we present our actual findings in table 11 below.  
 
 
Actual ISA Interviewee(s) Goal(s) Value(s) 
A9: Very conscious of 
not to snoop or pry 
N1, N6, N7, N8, N9, 
N10 & N11 




G4: Protect sensitive 
patient information 
V1: It is important 




V4: It is important to 
protect the privacy of 
patients (Privacy) 
A10: Prepare for 
possible new pa-
tients  
N3, N4, N5, N6, N7 & 
N8 
G5: Easy access to in-
formation 





V7: It is important to 
ensure a high quality 
of health care (Qual-
ity of health care) 
Table 11: Information Access (Actual). 
Overall there was a mutual understanding across the hospital’s employees that snooping 
is not okay (Interviewee, N6, N9, N10, N11). We were also told that tales circulated the 
hospital, that might scare employees into compliance (Interviewee, N9, N11) along with 
the awareness of traceability and consequences (Interviewee, N6,  N9, N10). This was a 
part of the foundation stones of duty of confidentiality and the job for health workers 
(Interviewee, N10). Besides, relatively recently, the patients can also check for who has 
read their journal, so it is even more transparent (Interviewee, N11).  
 
Regarding ISA A10, there were quite a few of our respondents that noted that the strict 
rules on prying had some drawbacks when it came to not being able to prepare for new 
incoming patients. A common practice for patient logistics between departments is to 
read up on possible incoming patients to be prepared (Interviewee, N3, N6, N8). Search-
ing for information about patients that have not been formally transferred to your de-
partment is not allowed, as you do not have the basis of treatment. On the other hand, 
knowing information about the patient beforehand is beneficial (Interviewee, N6 & N8) 
even if the patient is not transferred yet and might get canceled (Interviewee, N6). 
 
The preparation part. i.e., if I know my patient is number six in the queue for sur-
gery today, I can only access my patient, I can not see if surgery has started on pa-
tient number four … So if my patient requires medicine administered one hour be-
fore surgery, I do not know when this “one hour before” is supposed to be. (Inter-






Figure 6: Information Access. 
For the hospital, confidentiality (V1) and the privacy of patients (V4) are two essential 
building blocks. Consequently, the prescribed policies (P8, P9, P10) are created to pro-
tect the privacy of patients (G4) and make sure that only authorized personnel have ac-
cess to information (G2). Based on our interviews, we also see that this is a part of the 
actual practice as well, and it is a part of the work responsibility (Interviewee, N10). Ac-
cordingly, the awareness of this topic shows that the prescribed- and actual ISAs are ho-
mogenous, with one exception: preparation (A10).  
 
As mentioned above, preparation is a common practice among nurses. The nurses want 
easy access to information (G5) before the patient is transferred, to prepare for the 
treatment. That is based on the value of availability (V6) and the quality of health care 
(V7). The nurses want to be prepared when the patient arrives to deliver the highest 
quality, which is the best for both sides (Interviewee, N6). The actual practice of looking 
up patients not transferred (A10) and the prescribed policies create a conflict. However, 
this practice is not prying and just practical preparation (Interviewee, N8). We under-
stand that this is just practical; however, according to the policies, this practice is in a 
gray area.  
 
Lastly, we identified that actual ISA A9 has the same goals (G2 & G4) as the prescribed 
ISAs in this situation. Hence, support of the associated values V1 & V4 is then assured.   
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5.5 Information Protection  
 
In the following table nr. 12, we showcase two prescribed ISAs that regulate information 
protection at SSHF.  
 
Prescribed ISA Source Goal(s) Value(s) 
P11: You should always 
log off your PC, always 
lock the computer 




G2:  Only authorized 
personnel with access 
 
G4: Protect sensitive 
patient information 




V4: It is important to 
protect the privacy of 
patients (Privacy) 
P12: In case of absence 
from the workstation, 
and at the end of the 
workday, the user must 
log out of every system 
Normen 
Factsheet 27 
G2:  Only authorized 
personnel with access 
 
G4: Protect sensitive 
patient information 




V4: It is important to 
protect the privacy of 
patients (Privacy) 
Table 12: Information Protection (Prescribed). 
The prescribed rules of always locking computers (P11) were created to make sure only 
authorized personnel had access (G2). This applies when leaving the workstation (P11) 
and also at the end of the workday (P12). This is all connected back to always having an 
authorized user who performs the action (Interviewee, A1).  
“… the policy’s intension is that the PC shall be locked, having a screensaver that requires a 
password prompt before allowing the user back into the system.” (Interviewee, A1).  
 
We see the shared user-login (Information sharing) as a situation where the employee is 
more aware of the actions while leaving the PC unlocked (Information protection) is 
more a subconscious action. We can also differentiate the two situations by looking at 
the shared user accounts as a more organization-wide culture, while information protec-
tion is more on a personal scale. This distinction was also exemplified during the inter-
views with leaving the computer for a coffee- or toilet break, related to information pro-
tection.  
 
Table 13 below shows the actions we uncovered while interviewing nursing personnel 





Actual ISA Interviewee(s) Goal(s) Value(s) 
A11: Patient journal 
system left unlocked 
N1, N2, N3, N4, N6, 
N7, N11 & N12 
















V7: It is important to 
ensure a high quality 
of health care (Qual-
ity of health care) 
A12: Using another 
colleague’s (un-
locked) user-session  
N5 & N12 G6: Time saving V5: It is important to 
be efficient (Effi-
ciency) 
Table 13: Information Protection (Actual). 
We found numerous reasons why actual ISA A11 happened at the hospital. When the 
alarm bell sounds and calls for attention during an emergency situation, nursing person-
nel leave their workstations, to prioritize handling the emergency (G10) (Interviewee, 
N2, N3, N4 & N6) - in the heat of the moment, forgetting or not minding taking the time 
to lock the PC, leaving the patient journal system open. “Usually, if I plan to leave, I lock it. 
But if the alarm sounds or someone asks me for something, I turn around and walk. Not 
logging out, so it happens quite often.” (Interviewee, N4).  
Actual ISA A12 can be exemplified as a worker using another colleague's user-session, 
typically when the colleague is not around but has left the system unlocked (Inter-
viewee, N5 & N12). This is generally related to time-saving (G6) as our interviewee N12 
told us: “But of course, if you are just checking a quick small matter, it does take some time 
to log in. Then it is tempting to use an unlocked PC for just checking this one matter.”.  
 
This was a practice that also the physicians practiced when they came for their doctor's 
round. Our impression was that the employees had some mixed feelings about this as 
they saw the practicality behind it, but also the risk of information being exposed to un-





Figure 7: Information Protection. 
Again we see the values of confidentiality (V1), and privacy of patients (V4) come for-
ward as the values for the prescribed policies (P11 & P12).  This emphasizes the im-
portance of those and that all actions performed must be linked to an authorized user 
(Interviewee, A1). This situation is diverse and can have many different underlying val-
ues. Possibly the main reason is handling time-saving (G6) and the elemental value of ef-
ficiency (V5). Signing out of your colleague's account and signing in to your own user 
takes too much time (Interviewee, N6, N8, N11 & N12). “When the computer is unlocked, 
it is tempting just to check a small thing; but then, we often tell our colleague that we 
checked something on their login.” (Interviewee, N12). This practice was also elaborated 
on by interviewee A1:  
 
… due to the time aspect, it is easy to leave the computer without thinking twice. 
They probably have such a collegial acceptance that “I just used your login since it 
was already signed in.” Formally, it is a deviation from the prescribed policies. 
 
This creates a conflict between being efficient (V5) and having information available 
(V6) with the values of confidentiality (V1) and the privacy of patients (V4).  
Another detail that plays a significant role in the time aspect is emergencies and han-
dling them (G10). When there is an emergency happening, it is easy to leave the com-
puter and forget the buttons to lock the computer and rush to the location (Interviewee, 
N3, N4). The underlying value behind this is the importance of high-quality health care 
(V7). Leaving the computer unlocked and vulnerable, conflicts with prescribed policies’ 
values of confidentiality (V1), and the privacy of patients (V4).  
 
5.6 Summary of results 
 
Our study focused on the understanding of underlying goals and values related to infor-
mation security compliance in the hospital sector. The findings from the interviews were 
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categorized into 12 prescribed ISAs and 12 actual ISAs. These ISAs have been the basis 
for our result chapter and will be further discussed in the following chapter. We found 
that the hospital has strict policies to ensure high-quality health care and the protection 
of patient rights and privacy. Nursing personnel is overall very inline and compliant, and 
as such, support the value of high quality of health care (V7). However, we identified a 
recurring conflict between confidentiality (V1) and efficiency (V5). These results are in 
line with previous literature on the topic, which has looked into the values of different 
workgroups; we discuss this topic in chapter 6.2. We presented five specific situations 
related to health care practices and what type of actual ISAs that conflict with the associ-
ated prescribed policies. We present data about the rationality behind the actions of 
non-compliance with policies. In general, we see that the actual practice differentiates 
from the prescribed policies, which is not unusual. Based on the actual practice, we see 
that especially efficiency (V5) stands out as the most recurring value but also availability 
(V6) and quality of health care (V7). For the prescribed policies, confidentiality (V1) and 
privacy (V4) are highlighted. We see the nurses often want to be efficient and spend 
time with the patient to perform the treatment or service.  
 
When exploring the value conflicts of information security in nursing practices, we also 
came across a couple of supporting values. In our situation related to reporting (chapter 
5.3), we drew the conclusion that the prescribed ISA P6 & P7 had the same goal (G8) as 
we extracted from the actual ISA A7. This shared understanding of learning from past 
mistakes (G8), made for native support of the same value that it is important to ensure 
high quality of health care (V7). We also see support between awareness (V8) and en-
sure a high quality of health care (V7). Learning from past mistakes and being aware of 
them can influence the quality of the health care practice in the long run. Also, support 
was identified in chapter 5.4, when both prescribed and actual ISA had the same goals 
relating to information protection. This finding signals support with values V1 & V4 in 
relation to snooping. 
 
At the hospital, different people work with different professions, in different phases with 
different intensity (Interviewee, A2).  This reflects the information security awareness 
among employees (Interviewee, A2). This is also something we observed during inter-
views; some of the employees were slightly skeptical of being a part of the study, while 
others were quick to sign the agreement. After all, there is a shared goal of patient treat-
ment, even for employees working with the economy, IT, or HR (Interviewee, A2). Over-
all, our impression is that the actual practices that violate the policies always have the 
intention to do what is best for the patient.  





In this chapter, we present lessons learned and discuss them with pre-existing litera-
ture. We choose to work with established theory, but we will compare results against 
other prior research that we also found to be relevant. The results from interviews will 
be discussed in light of previous literature and our research questions. We start by dis-
cussing the actual practice versus the prescribed policies with a focus on compliance. 
Next, we go on to debate the difference in view on information security between differ-
ent groups. Third, we elaborate on how our findings and our modification on the Value-
Based Compliance method compare with the original work on Value-based Compliance 
by Kolkowska et al. (2017) and Hedström et al. (2011).  Finally, we end this chapter with 
a short concluding paragraph.  
 
6.1 Compliance - actual practices vs. prescribed policies  
 
The results from Bulgurcu et al. (2010) show that attitude, normative beliefs signifi-
cantly influence employee’s intention to comply with information security policies, 
along with self-efficacy to comply. We can draw lines to our findings and relate our re-
sults with their study. In our results, we interviewed each nurse alone and presented the 
situations and asked for actual practice. Based on the answers we got, we could compare 
goals and connect those with underlying values. The nurses interviewed do have a spe-
cific attitude, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy, which creates a basis for the goals and 
values in each situation. Based on our findings, we also see that the same values often 
are connected to the same group of employees. For example, prying, where next to all 
nurses told us this is not allowed and that prying is not a part of their job.  
 
Using scenarios can help to reveal the differences in an employee’s intention to comply 
with specific rules and regulations since these scenarios can provide detailed explana-
tions about specific policies (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). In our study, we followed the VBC-
method from Hedström et al. (2017), and we provided a detailed description of situa-
tions that were validated through information security managers and the first inter-
views with nurses. We presented the questions on a higher level with, for example, ask-
ing about the department as a whole and not on a personal scale. We did this to mini-
mize the risk of employees concealing the truth because they see non-compliance as so-
cially undesirable (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Employees holding back the truth is definitely 
a possibility as talking about situations where they stray away from policies can be felt 
like exposing colleagues, themselves, or the department as a whole.  
 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) look at work impediments as a detriment for daily job-related 
tasks and that work impediment caused by compliance with ISP is positively associated 
with the perceived cost of compliance. This is in line with our findings as the nurses use 
shared user accounts under circumstances where the cost of compliance by, for exam-
ple, waiting for the system to log out of their colleague's session and then relog into their 
user (Interviewee, N3, N5, N6 & N12). The nurses perceive the cost of being compliant 
with the related policies of not sharing accounts is high and that it acts as a hindrance. 
On the other hand, information security awareness has a negative influence on work im-
pediments (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). When awareness is raised among the employees, the 
employees might not look at the policies as a work impediment anymore, because they 
now see the reasons behind it or the need for it. This result strengthens the importance 
 
48 
of creating a security-aware culture within the organization, which improves infor-
mation security (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  
 
Routines for monitoring and controlling information security compliance is often devel-
oped on a top-down-approach, without sufficient inclusion of daily work practices 
(Hedström et al., 2011). Following the VBC method implicates that security officers 
should shift focus from looking for expected use and misuse of information systems, to 
focus on finding the actual use and misuse. People have been viewed as a problem in the 
information security context for a long time, which has led to the development of 
measures to enforce policies. We see, for example, Boss, S. R., Kirsch, Angermeier, Shin-
gler & Boss, R. W. (2009), who argue that mandatoriness is effective in motivating the 
employees to follow the policies. Furthermore, Herath & Rao (2009), explores the role of 
penalties, pressures, and perceived contribution as motivating factors in information se-
curity behaviors. The results show that the normative beliefs regarding expectations of 
superiors or managers play an essential role in employees' behavior along with the be-
havior of other colleagues as well. They also argue that managers need to adopt mecha-
nisms to investigate and evaluate the security performance of their employees by, for 
example, monitoring (Herath & Rao, 2009). A common denominator in these studies is 
the role of control-based compliance with sanctions and regulations to motivate the em-
ployees. We see the value of this type of approach; however, in the hospital sector, we 
argue that deterrence techniques might not be the best approach and that understand-
ing the values and a more open dialogue might be more suited. Based on our empirical 
data, we can, for example, see that employees got scared away from prying into patient 
journals as “…We have probably been sufficiently frightened away from it” (Interviewee, 
N8), and “I think people are very conscious of not snooping because they know they can get 
tracked” (Interviewee, N11). On the other hand, nurses might end up in situations where 
workarounds might be appropriate as “things work differently in practice.” (Interviewee, 
N6). In total, having authority as a basis with an open dialogue that non-compliance 
might be accepted in some scenarios where severity is low or the health of patients is at 
risk.  
 
6.2 Differences across job roles 
 
In the article by Vaast (2007), “Danger is in the eye of the beholders: Social representa-
tions of Information Systems security in healthcare,” a study was conducted at a hospital 
in a northeastern US city, with the goal of describing IS security from the point of view of 
different communities. “Investigations aimed at studying the similarities and differences 
of representations of IS security by different occupational communities.” (Vaast, 2007, p. 
134). This is similar to what we did in a Norwegian context. Our selected two different 
professional communities were one, the nurses, and two, the information security offic-
ers in charge of enforcing the policies. We choose only two communities because of time 
constraints, and we managed to get an understanding of the ideas and concepts from the 
point of view of the persons involved. The health care sector includes many different oc-
cupational communities, like, physicians, nurses, technical workers; their training and 
daily practice vary, but they are still involved with patient care in one way or another 
(Vaast, 2007). From our study, we identified different underlying values between 
nurses’ practice and the information security policies that are the responsibility of an-
other occupational community, the information security workers. The tasks these two 
different groups perform on a daily basis vary to a large degree because of their 
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different job descriptions. We found that both groups value information security; how-
ever, the deeply-held health care values of the nurses will often take precedence within 
this particular professional community. The results from Hedström et al. (2011) also 
show that health care professionals choose to prioritize health care values over infor-
mation security values under certain circumstances. This is also supported by our find-
ings, which shows that the five situations presented, all have at least one conflict. 
 
Vaast (2007) states that: “Members of different occupational communities, faced by differ-
ent contexts, engaging in various activities, and interacting with various parties, represent 
IS security in different ways.” (p. 133). While we do agree with this statement, we find it 
to be a bit vague. Nurses and information security workers have different educational 
backgrounds, and we think a lot of the professional values are being shaped during 
those educational years of an individual. These occupational values are likely to be am-
plified when surrounding yourself with people with a similar background, peers, at a 
workplace. In our time at the hospital, we noticed a physical distance between the two 
groups, nurses in the treatment areas of the hospital, and the security officers in the 
more administrative offices. It seems natural to us that these different groups will have 
different values and representations of information security because of their diverse cir-
cumstances. Besides, not all groups perceive information security the same way, and 
health care practitioners base their actions on different rationalities when complying 
and not complying with information security policies (Hedström et al., 2011). In our re-
sults, we have shown that time-saving and the need to be efficient, could affect the infor-
mation security negatively. By advocating the information security mangers to include 
actual compliance actions will possibly lead to the health practitioners feeling like they 
are not just a part of their own occupational community but rather the whole organiza-
tion's information security culture. 
 
The view on differences between groups is also shown in the results from Albrechtsen & 
Hovden (2009) as they did a study on the different understandings between information 
security managers and users in regards to information security. They argue that from a 
socio-technical perspective, the difference in security skills, knowledge, perceptions of 
information security, social norms, and interpersonal relationships can result in differ-
ences (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009). This is something that reflects in our results by 
looking at individuals at SSHF; we got different answers from the interviews. This could 
be due to each individual having different security skills, knowledge, perception of infor-
mation security, social norms, and interpersonal relationship.  
 
In the study of Albrechtsen & Hovden (2009), they also found that the users did not real-
ize the benefits of information security and that practicality and efficiency were more 
important for their work. This is indeed also supported by our results; we found results 
that showed that efficiency (V5), availability (V6), and quality of health care (V7) were 
valued over more information security-related values such as confidentiality (V1) and 
privacy (V4). The prioritization of health care workers' values over more information 
security values is shown in our results with specific examples and circumstances. Re-
lated to realizing the benefits of information security, an excellent example from our 
study is prying into patient journals. Based on our interviews, we found that prying is 
not accepted and that the nurses are very conscious of this topic (Interviewee, N1, N6, 
N7, N8, N9, N10 & N11). On the other hand, they also had a specific situation with prepa-




Albrechtsen & Hovden (2009) also argue that organizations and their stakeholders are 
living organisms and not stable, efficient, and predictable systems. They further elabo-
rate on do not take into account human resources and values (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 
2009). We see this as relevant for our study by taking into account the values of the ac-
tual practice in situations where non-compliance to policies are based on different val-
ues. It is essential to look into the reasons for non-compliance and not look at the poli-
cies as black and white. For example, in the hospital sector, the situations might vary 
each day, and the nurses might have good reasons based on values, for not complying 
with the more static policies. In practice, things work differently (Interviewee, N6). The 
policies will not be able to cover every possible scenario that nurses might end up in.  
We also saw based on our results that such differences exist.  
 
They [policy workers] have no idea what an intensive care unit is… they do not have 
a real picture of how things are handled. I also think that we do not quite under-
stand what they are thinking and why either. (Interviewee, N8).  
 
As the results of Albrechtsen & Hovden (2009), we propose more significant interaction 
and dialogue between the groups to obtain this understanding.  
 
6.3 Continuing the work on Value-Based Compliance 
 
We will now look at Hedström et al. (2011) and Kolkowska et al. (2017) and point to 
similarities and differences with our own findings. The purpose of the 2011 paper was 
to create a new conceptual and practical tool to manage the tension between infor-
mation security policies and the daily practice of information security by its employees 
(Hedström et al., 2011). It is argued that looking into and understanding the values and 
reflecting on those creates a secure information security environment. This is further ex-
emplified with the situation of protecting and securing passwords, which are based on 
the prescribed values of confidentiality (V1), accountability, and integrity. However, the 
actual practice conflicts as the health care workers value care productivity and easy 
availability under these circumstances Hedström et al. (2011).  These findings are also 
similar to our findings and support those. We found that making sure only authorized 
people had access to information (G2) and protecting the privacy of the patients (G4) 
were important in, for example, “uncritical of sharing information.” These goals be-
longed to the prescribed rules created by information security management, which was 
created on the values of confidentiality (V1) and protecting privacy (V4). On the other 
hand, based on our interviews, we found that under some circumstances, the goal of 
time-saving (G6) and the value of efficiency (V5) were prioritized. These findings go into 
detail on each situation and compare the prescribed and the actual ISAs. Overall based 
on our results, we see that confidentiality (V1) and privacy (V4) are the most dominant 
for the prescribed rules. For the health care workers' actual practice, we saw that effi-
ciency (V5), availability (V6), and quality of health care (V7) were the dominating val-
ues. This is consistent with prior research by Hedström et al.: “The prescribe rules related 
to patient information protection are based on confidentiality (v1), as found in the CIA-
triad, while maximizing patient time (v3) and accessibility to information (v2) are values 




Our findings indicate that nursing personnel prioritizes their deeply-held professional 
values like ensuring a high quality if health care and maximizing time with patients. This 
aligns very well with Hedström et al. (2011). We interpret that the goal of time-saving 
(G6) and the value of efficiency (V5) are done in order to be able to spend the maximum 
amount of time with patients. This increased time dedicated to patients will likely lead 
to a higher quality of health care. Furthermore, we found that nurses are cautious about 
what they tell other colleagues regarding patient information; they might discuss cases 
but are careful not to reveal sensitive information. Also, nursing personnel is wary of not 
prying into patient journals that they do not have any legal treatment basis for doing. 
What is interesting is that the value of being effective does happen to come into conflict 
with the privacy of patients. As an example: a nurse is quick to respond to an emergency 
situation because she/he wants to ensure a high quality of health care. But in the pro-
cess of getting to the action, leaves the workstation and patient journal system unlocked. 
In this situation, patient privacy is compromised. Now the likelihood of someone abus-
ing this unlocked user-session is somewhat low, but nevertheless, the risk is still there. 
However, there are rules in the workstation system that ensure a lockdown of an inac-
tive user account after a short period. So nursing personnel might argue and say that 
this is a risk they are willing to take. An important thing to keep in mind is that people 
react instinctively in the case of an emergency, and as such, nursing personnel might 
leave a workstation unlocked by a subconscious act.  
 
The work of health care personnel is a highly time-critical practice, and the personnel 
holds strong professional values (Hedström et al., 2011). This can furthermore create an 
environment where the information security rules can operate under the risk of being 
ignored or the users create their own practice that is not that safe (Hedström et al., 
2011). An example from Kolkowska et al. (2017) is: “The pressure to treat as many pa-
tients as possible and the lack of technical solutions to support the pre-scribed ISAs means 
that staff felt justified in developing their own information-handling routines.” (p. 49).  
For our study, we found various actual practices that differ in safety level. For example, 
the use of shared user accounts in systems with a small amount of sensitive information 
(ISA A1, A2 & A3) or just fixing the incidents rather than reporting (ISA A8) is not really 
hampering the security. On the other hand, discussing information about patients over 
the phone or in hallways (ISA A4 & A5) or leaving the computer unlocked in the patient 
journal system (ISA A11) could have some more negative consequences. These practices 
created by health care professionals is based on the values of efficiency and availability, 
which can put the confidentiality and accountability at risk and indeed, the safety and 
privacy of patient information.  
 
We distinguish our work from Hedström et al. (2011) in a way that, in their study, the 
focus was on conflicts only. “We have chosen examples that, in a very clear way, illustrate 
value conflicts between prescribed and actual ISAs.” (Hedström et al., 2011, p. 377). In our 
work, we choose to also look into the supporting values as we think it is important to 
point to areas if alignment where the organization is doing good, not just show areas for 
improvement. We found three circumstances which had direct support, based on our 
empirical data. Giving credit where it is due will hopefully make the nursing personnel 
positive to be a part of organizational improvement programs. Furthermore, it is crucial 
to identify these supporting values to ensure that they will be preserved. Our study 




6.4 Wrapping up the discussion 
 
Overall, we found that the findings of our study are very much aligned with prior re-
search. We see that nurses base their decisions on typical health care values and that the 
policies are built on security values. Under certain circumstances in specific situations, 
efficiency and time-saving are valued over confidentiality and privacy. When comparing 
the results to Hedström et al. (2011), we see many similarities, but we also show that 
the theory can be used for supports as well. We see comprehensible differences between 
the groups of professions and that the actual practice can vary from the written policies. 
There are indeed differences on individual levels because of security skills, social norms, 
perceptions of information security policies; however, employees from the same occu-
pational communities are on the same wavelength. Creating an environment where both 
communities understand each group’s values could improve the overall information se-
curity as well as open up for more cooperation. Following the VBC method could help 






7. Implications and future directions 
 
In this section, we present the potential impact of the findings from our study. The first 
two subsections propose implications for research and practice. Then, the study’s limita-
tions are discussed. Finally, we conclude this chapter by showing possible directions for 
future research.  
 
7.1 Implications for research 
 
In the method chapter, we showed how we modified the method as we did not have ac-
cess to observations. We developed the interview guides by adding detailed descriptions 
and examples of the situations we presented to the interviewees. Our results indicate 
that the method can be used without observations as a complementary part of the data 
collection. This shows that the VBC method can be used by other students who might 
not have the access level as for example, researchers or information security managers 
would be able to get. Nevertheless, as we also note in the limitations subsection (7.3), by 
not including observation as a data source, it is possible to miss out on some actual ac-
tions, and this is a drawback.  
 
The VBC method was created as a tool for investigating the underlying values of why 
employees comply or not comply with information security policies (Kolkowska et al., 
2017). For our study, we found it is natural to include supports as well as conflicts ex-
panding the scope of VBC. Emphasizing supports could make the employees feel more 
positive towards revealing their actual ISAs when the VBC method is being used for in-
ternal assessments. Our expansion of the method can be further explored in future em-
pirical studies that take such an inclusive approach covering both value conflicts and 
value supports.  
 
Our interviewees confirmed all the situations that we developed as relevant situations in 
daily practice. By using the VBC theory, we showcase a rich approach to understanding 
the rationale behind employee compliance. We have provided insights that call for fur-
ther exploration and explanation for understanding the employee’s compliance ra-
tionale.    
 
7.2 Implications for practice 
 
Our results provide insights about the rationalities behind the actual practices of nurses. 
We present patterns or situations that the management team is not always aware of to-
day. We also present a set of underlying reasons for the choices that nurses have for 
their non-compliance. These insights can be further used when developing policies al-
lowing the management to see the viewpoint of nurses for specific situations. More in-
teraction and dialogue are likely to improve each group’s understanding of the work the 
other does and bridge the divide between them, making the security measures more ef-
fective (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009). Hopefully, our study will allow accessing the un-
tapped potential of a better understanding of information security in the everyday prac-
tice of nurses by seeing users as resources instead of problems. Leading to a change in 
the old ways of thinking: “Employees are still seen as the biggest obstacle to information 
security.” (Kolkowska et al., 2017, p. 51). Also, following the VBC method implicates that 
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security managers should shift focus to looking for the actual practices. Routines for 
monitoring and controlling information security compliance is often developed on a top-
down-approach, without sufficient inclusion of daily work practices (Hedström et al., 
2011). In our results, we have shown that time-saving and the need to be efficient, often 
affects the information security negatively. By advocating the information security man-
gers to include actual compliance actions will possibly lead to the health practitioners 
feeling like they are not just a part of their own occupational community but rather the 




By using the VBC method without including the complementary observations, we base 
our results on documents and interviews only. By not including observations as a data 
source, it is possible that we missed out on additional ISAs, as some actual actions can be 
hidden or that the employees are reluctant when it comes to self-reporting. The natural 
scope-limit and time-constraint of doing a master thesis, combined with the sensitive 
hospital sector, made it necessary to exclude observations from our study. Moreover, 
our results are based on the interviewee's opinions and interpretations, with us as re-
searchers added as an extra layer of interpretation.  
 
In our study, we wanted to include a variety of nurses from various departments to get 
an overview of the hospital as a whole. This means that we included 2-3 participants 
from each respective department, which might not be sufficient to reflect the actual 
practice as a total. If we were to include more participants, we could be more sure that 
the results actually reflect the situation in the whole hospital. Following the VBC 
method, we provide a status, as per now, of the organization. We do not show how to im-
prove information security practices. Nevertheless, as we identify areas where the ac-
tual actions of employees are in conflict with the prescribed policies, organizations get 
an overview of where to focus their efforts. We, as researchers, met little resistance in 
conducting our research at the hospital. All our interview candidates were forthcoming 
and seemed content to be a part of the study. However, security managers might find it 
harder to do such an investigation internally since the employees might feel like they are 
being “investigated” and therefore withhold some of the actual actions.  
 
7.4 Future directions 
 
Hedström et al. (2011) conducted their empirical study in the Swedish health sector and 
encouraged future research using the VBC in other countries. To our knowledge, this is 
the first time this method has been used in the Norwegian health sector, so we suggest 
that comparing the results from SSHF with other Norwegian hospitals would give fruit-
ful results. This could be done by presenting the situations we used at another hospital 
and see if the values and actual practice presented matches. Another future direction 
could be to go deeper into SSHF and expand the participants to see if the results are cur-
rent at the hospital as a whole. This could also further explore even more actual practice 
at SSHF, and here it would be vital to have access to do observations.  
 
As proposed in Kolkowska et al. (2017), to have a look into if employees are willing to 
reveal their actual ISAs when information security managers collect the data as opposed 
to external researchers, and to see the VBC method used as an internal training 
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program, would be exciting. In order for this, an organization would have to carry out 
the VBC method on its own.  
 
Another way forward would be to investigate how the new digital health-curve system 
MetaVision that was implemented in early March 2020 has affected some of the ISAs, or 
to see if it has created new ones. During our interviews, we discovered that several of 
the candidates had experienced that this new solution requires several additional steps 
before registering patient information than the previously existing system. This type of 
registering is done many times a day and could possibly take up more time then the pen 
& paper system the hospital used before MetaVision. So it might be that the employees 
create some kind of workaround that could be in conflict with the prescribed ISAs in this 
situation.  
 
For this study, we collected rich empirical material that we analyzed using the VBC theo-
retical lens. An interesting direction for future research would be to analyze the empiri-
cal material through dialectics. Dialectics are useful for understanding contradictions 
that pull in opposite directions (Moe, Newman & Sein, 2017) and can bring useful in-







This study contributes to research on information security practices and builds upon the 
already existing stream of research of value-based compliance with a contribution of 
knowledge about the Norwegian health sector and its values. Our results are compatible 
with the findings in Hedström et al. (2011), as we find several conflicts between practice 
and actual ISAs. However, we did not only focus on conflicts but deemed identifying sup-
porting actions as equally important in order to get a holistic view.  
 
Our study shows empirical evidence that the VBC method can be used to look into con-
flicts and supports in concrete situations between prescribed and actual practice. We 
have furthermore explored the understanding of information security between health 
care professionals and information security management and that there is a difference 
in underlying values, based on job roles. Our results show that health care values, such 
as efficiency (V5), availability (V6), and quality of healthcare (V7), are predominant in 
the actual practice. Moreover, the typical information security values such as confidenti-
ality (V1) and privacy (V4), are the underpinnings of the prescribed policies. The most 
recurring conflict is between confidentiality (V1) and privacy (V4), against efficiency 
(V5). Furthermore, we identified support between the goals and values of actual and 
prescribed actions in the situations of reporting (chapter 5.3), and in information access 
(chapter 5.4).  
 
We want to point to implications for the practice of information security management 
and encourage the utilization of the VBC method for uncovering actual usage and misus-
age of information systems. Understanding the values of employees will help get insights 
into compliance with IS-security. Furthermore, we recognize that it could be a demand-
ing task to carry out VBC in the organization, but we propose the method can be scaled 
down or adapted in order to be more accomplishable. The first execution of the VBC 
method could leave out doing observations, then at a later point, it then would be inter-
esting to do a second execution where you include observations, and see if it has uncov-
ered previously hidden ISAs.  
 
After conducting this case study, we are left with the overall impression that the actual 
practices that violate the policies always have the intention to do what is best for the pa-
tient. Though, it is not ideal to live in contradiction, should you seek to resolve, or con-
tinue to live in conflict? To answer this, we have proposed different ways to do research 
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10.1 Interview guide nursing personnel 
 








A.    Oppstart av samtalen (5 min.)   
Spør om de har lest informasjonsskriv. 




Forklare hva målet vårt er. For å lære.  
Hva vi har funnet fra litteratur når vi snakker 
om informasjonssikkerhet.  
 
Infosystems. Digitalisering. Hvordan bruke tek-
nologi på en best mulig måte.  
 
 
Vi er ute etter svar basert på din erfaring og 
hvordan du og dine kollegaer forholder dere til 
informasjonssikkerhet i hverdagen.  
Kort om deg selv: 











a) Kort om hvordan er et skift organisert 
b) Hvem holder “morgenmøte”  
c) Er det en leder på hvert skift?  
 
d) Hvem er din nærmeste leder?  
 
e) Hvordan får du oversikt over hva som 
skjer, hvilke pasienter du skal behandle 
per. dag?  
 
f) Hvordan vil du beskrive informasjonssik-
kerheten blant ansatte her?  
   
Spørsmål a – d, ble kun brukt i de innledende 
intervjuene.  
 










▪ Sensitiv informasjon på lapp  
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
 
Enkle notater i lommen 
 
▪ Lister med pasientinformasjon 
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 





Henger til info på behandlingsrom. Lunsjrom. 
Med intensjon.  
▪ Delt brukerinnlogging 
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
 
Delt passord/brukernavn. DIPS 
 
62 
▪ Ikke logge ut/låse brukerkonto 
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
Kopp kaffe, toalettbesøk. Gå fra PC ulåst.  
▪ Ikke godkjenne egne dokumenter før 
hjemreise 
▪ Skjer dette? Ofte? 
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
Godkjenne notater til en pasient.  
▪ Godkjenne andres dokumenter ved 
vaktstart 
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
Henger sammen med den over.  
▪ «Snoking» (informasjon om seg selv, el-
ler familie) 
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
 
 
▪ Behandle 2 pasienter før man registre-
rer informasjon i EPJ.  
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
 
Utsetter å registrere. Huske i hodet, eller lapp 
i lommen. 
 
▪ 2 sykepleiere behandler samme pasi-
ent, på en samme bruker.    
▪ Skjer dette?   
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke?  
 
 




▪ Ikke rapportere avvik   
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
 
Hvor lite avvik er det snakk som eventuelt 
ikke blir rapportert inn? 
 
- F.eks. finne et ark på feil sted, legger 
det kanskje tilbake igjen bare 
 
  
▪ Ikke makulere sensitiv informasjon  
▪ Skjer dette? 
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
 
F.eks. kastes i vanlig søppel 
 
▪ Ukritisk deling av informasjon slik at 
andre kan overhøre (andre pasienter, 
kollegaer f.eks. på venterom).  
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
 
 
▪ Bruke personlig mail til jobb relaterte 
dokumenter  
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
Er det mulighet for dette? 
▪ Lagre sensitiv info i uautoriserte loka-
sjoner 
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
Legger igjen på møterom/behandlingsrom. 
Ikke på dedikert plass. Ulåst rom.  
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▪ Forsendelse av informasjon til feil per-
son 
▪ Skjer dette?  
▪ Hvorfor? Målet bak dette? 
▪ Hvorfor ikke? 
 
Internpost, feil hylle. 
 
Tror du dette hadde blitt rapportert? 
 
 
Avslutning (5 min)   
a) Er det noe som vi ikke har spurt om, 
som du mener vi bør vite før vi går vi-
dere i prosessen? 
 
b) Info om veien vår videre: 
▪ Tilgjengelig for spm. på mail  





Var situasjonene greie å forstå?  
 
Selg prosjektet. Snowball.   
  







10.2 Interview guide security manager 
 
This guide was used for identifying goals and values from the prescribed ISAs. We asked 
the security manager to elaborate and explain the intention of the following policies.  
 
S03 Delt brukerinnlogging  
 
- Du skal ikke dele brukernavn og passord med andre (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
- Alle brukere skal ha eget brukernavn og passord til alle systemer (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
- Felles bruker-ID og passord skal ikke benyttes i applikasjoner med helse- og personopp-
lysninger.  
Med felles menes at to eller flere brukere deler den samme bruker-ID og passord. (Ref: 
Faktaark 31)   
- Utlån av passordet til andre personer er ikke tillatt (Ref: Faktaark 31)   
- Passordet er personlig og skal ikke deles med andre personer (Ref: Faktaark 31)    
 
S04 Ikke logge ut av brukerkonto   
- Man skal alltid logge av PC, lås alltid når du går i fra. Tips er også å bruke «Windows + L» 
(Ref. Faktaark 27)   
-      Ved fravær fra arbeidsplass og ved arbeidsdagens slutt skal bruker logge ut av alle syste-
mer (Ref: Faktaark 27)   
S07 Snoking  
 
- Du vet hva du kan og ikke kan lese (Ref: Faktaark 27)   
▪ Det er forbudt å lese, søke eller på annen måte tilegne seg eller bruke opplysninger 
uten at det er begrunnet i helsehjelp til pasienten, administrasjon av slik hjelp eller 
har særskilt hjemmel i lov eller forskrift (Ref: Faktaark 27)   
▪ Ikke lov å åpne i ektefelles, slektningers eller din egen journal, uten grunn. (Ref: 
Faktaark 27)   
- Det er ikke tillatt å søke etter informasjon man ikke har behov for eller ikke er autorisert 
for (Ref: Faktaark 27)   
-     Personopplysninger kan bare behandles når lovgivningen tillater det. All behandling av 
personopplysninger skal ha et lovlig grunnlag. I personvernforordningen kalles dette et be-
handlingsgrunnlag (Ref: Normen v.6)   
S10 Ikke rapportere avvik 
 
     -   Jeg vet hvordan jeg melder avvik (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
▪ Bruk avvikssystemet (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
▪ Se på det som et forbedringstiltak som gjør at man lærer av feil og kan endre rutiner (Ref.  
Faktaark 27)   




S12 Ukritisk deling av informasjon 
 
- Du vet hva og med hvem du kan dele pasientinformasjon (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
▪ Taushetsplikt gjelder også mellom helsepersonell (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
▪ Pass på at ikke uvedkommende lytter når du snakker om pasienter med en kollega, 
i telefon eller på offentlig sted (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
▪ Når du deler pasientopplysninger med andre må du forsikre deg om at vedkom-
mende du kommuniserer med har rett til å få opplysningene. Mottar du f.eks. tele-
fonsamtaler om pasienter, og du er i tvil om identiteten til innringer, kan du be om 
å få ringe vedkommende tilbake. (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
- Vær forsiktig og ikke røp sensitiv informasjon (Ref. Faktaark 27)   
 
 
 
